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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explains variation between contemporary Honduras and Nicaragua in 
terms of their levels of violent crime. The thesis is driven by an empirical observation: 
Nicaragua, a country that shares a border with Honduras and where the U.S.-backed 
Contras waged a civil war against the Sandinista government during much of the 1980s, 
is considerably less violent than Honduras, which did not undergo civil war.  This 
variation conflicts with expectations in studies of security in Central America that 
countries that have experienced civil war will, during the post-conflict period, experience 
higher rates of violent crime than countries that have not. In contrast, this thesis argues 
that in Nicaragua it was precisely the conclusion of the civil war that drew attention from 
domestic and international actors who implemented changes that resulted in the 
demilitarization of internal security, the reduction of weapons in society, and the 
emergence of social movements that gave ex-combatants voice through non-violent 
means. Honduras, which did not experience civil war and a subsequent peace process, has 
seen the circulation of large amounts of weaponry and ongoing military participation in 
internal security, which has meant human rights abuses and low social capital. 
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I. VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
A bus loaded with women and children in the city of Chamelecon, Honduras was 
sprayed with rifle fire on December 23, 2004.  Gang members killed 28 passengers, 
including six children, to express their displeasure with recent government efforts to fight 
organized crime.1  According to the Honduran Police, Policía Preventiva and the Public 
Ministry, Ministerio Público, (an institution independent from the three branches of 
government, designed to defend and to protect the general interest of Honduran society) 
“during the first three months of 2008, Honduras experienced 1,882 violent deaths, 518 
cases more than the previous year, representing an increase of 38 percent.”2  These 
statistics indicate that Honduras is one of the most dangerous countries in Latin 
America.3  
In comparison, Nicaragua, a country that shares a border with Honduras and 
where the U.S.-backed Contras waged a civil war against the Sandinista government 
during much of the 1980s, has less incidence of violence than most countries in Central 
America.  The security environment in Nicaragua defies conventional expectations.  Paul 
Collier, Professor of Economics, Oxford University and former director of the 
Development Research Group at the World Bank calculates that “in the first decade of 
post-conflict peace, societies face roughly twice the risk of conflict that the pre-conflict 
risk factors would predict.”4  Post-conflict societies have organizations with residual 
military capabilities and armaments, are accustomed to violence and most likely 
                                                 
1 BBC News, “Bus Massacre Kills 23 in Honduras,” BBC, December 24, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4124133.stm (accessed November 7, 2008); Reuters, “Honduras Gang 
Members Guilty of Xmas Bus Massacre,” Thomson Reuters, 
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21362073.htm (accessed November 7, 2008). 
2 Honduran Policía Preventiva and the Ministerio Público, Observatorio de la Violencia: Mortalidad y 
Otros, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Edición No. 10, 2008. Translation of the author.  
3 Honduras ranks as a “5,” on the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Level of Violent Crime, the 
highest qualitative measurement on the scale versus Nicaragua at “2.” See the Global Peace Index at 
www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings.php (accessed July 3, 2008). 
4 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” World Bank (2006): 
19. 
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politically polarized.  Additionally, countries without histories of democratic governance, 
like Nicaragua, face the difficult task of creating institutions from the rubble of 
authoritarian bureaucracies and are arguably more susceptible to a break down in law 
enforcement and criminal violence than countries with prior democratic experience. 
This thesis argues that three factors explain marked differences in security as 
measured by homicide rates: Nicaragua, unlike Honduras, is characterized by a relative 
scarcity of weapons, the existence of social movements that contribute to trust and the 
incorporation of excluded segments of the general public, and a relatively effective police 
force.  Furthermore, it argues that many of the violence mitigation mechanisms in 
Nicaragua resulted from the conflict resolution process (The United Nations Observer 
Group in Central America—ONUCA, November 1989-January 1992) following the 
Contra War.   
The military demobilization of Honduras after the Central American civil wars, 
on the other hand, was not supervised by an internationally sanctioned observer’s group.  
The incomplete demobilization of the Honduran military allowed it to maintain certain 
prerogatives, a monopoly on the importation of weapons being of the foremost concern of 
this thesis.  An additional concern is that the Honduran military is constitutionally bound 
to “cooperate with the National Police in keeping of the public order (Sec. 272).”5  The 
militarization of Honduran police forces has resulted in reports of human rights abuses 
that undermine social capital.  It is argued that widespread distrust in the Honduran 
criminal justice capacity combined with a militia disposition toward law enforcement and 
national defense resulted in a society struggling to overcome epidemic levels of criminal 
violence.     
                                                 
5 Honduran Constitution, “The Legal Framework,” in A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin 
America, ed. Juan Ria, 2008th ed. (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, 2008), 32. 
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAS AND 
NICARAGUA 
1. U.S. Security 
The importance of Honduras and Nicaragua to the United States is based 
primarily on proximity.  The risk of these states being overrun by drugs, crime, and 
poverty is arguably of greater concern to the United States than the failure of other 
countries that do not have access to a land route to its southern border.  An inundation of 
refugees fleeing north from Central America could further destabilize the 2,000 mile-long 
U.S./Mexican border area with drugs, illegal immigrants and create opportunities for 
terrorists to enter the country.  According to the 2005 U.S. Census, 740,820 Hispanics 
claim Nicaragua or Honduras as their place of origin.6  Many of these people are 
undocumented illegal aliens.   
At what point does criminal violence overwhelm a state?  Antonio Maria Costa, 
the Executive Director of the United Nations Office of Crime and Drugs (UNODC), 
succinctly defines a “failed state” as one that “no longer has a monopoly on the use of 
force and [whose] citizens no longer trust their leaders and public institutions.”7  In 
recent years, U.S. foreign policy has focused on weak and failing states as security 
threats.  Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras is listed on the World Bank’s catalogue of 
“Fragile States,” but if the illegal drug trade threatens the stability of Mexico, the 
potential consequences for Nicaragua and Honduras will be enormous.8  Like Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Honduras are caught between the region’s largest supplier of cocaine 
(Colombia) and principal drug consumer (the United States) and are threatened by the 
destabilizing effect of black-market forces that can buy political power.  Compared to 
Mexico, with a 2004 GDP of $676.5 billion, Honduras and Nicaragua are economic 
                                                 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, “Hispanic or Latino Origin by Specific Origin,” 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
ds_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_&-redoLog=false&-mt_name=ACS_2005_EST_G2000_B03001 
(accessed July 1, 2008). 
7 Antonio Maria Costa, Preface to “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the 
Crossfire United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,” 2007. 
8 Liana Sun Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy (CRS Report 
for Congress, Appendix B: 2007 World Bank Fragile States/Territories, 2007). 
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lightweights with a combined 2004 GDP of only $11.3 billion.9  Honduran and 
Nicaraguan law enforcement capacity is dwarfed by the global trade in illicit drugs, 
which is estimated to be more than three hundred billion dollars (2003).10  A 
conflagration of Central American states, overpowered by criminal elements, fueled 
either by drug cartels or a security vacuum, could lead to a contraction of Central 
American economies, lawlessness, humanitarian disaster, and a stampede of refugees 
overwhelming the U.S. border. 
Nicaragua is considered safer than Honduras in terms of violent crime but all 
states have “perversely privatized” areas, i.e., areas where the “public dimension of the 
state” have evaporated or never existed.11  As Robert H. Holden makes clear in his book 
Armies without Nations, “[s]tate institutions operate within—and typically dominate—the 
field of state power but they seldom monopolize it.  The boundaries of the field of state 
power, constituted not so much by structural borders but by fluid relationships, vary over 
time and space.”12   
The inability of Honduran leaders to control violent crime perpetrated in their 
territory is an indication that the country has lost the confidence of its citizens and is in 
danger of further instability.  As John Robb points out in a Brave New War, “[m]ost of 
the United States’ recent ‘wars…’ Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kosovo—were actually 
interventions within unstable states, rather than a conventional war against them.”13  
Theodore Leggett, a lead researcher for the UNODC adds that “[t]echnology and  
 
                                                 
9 CEPAL, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, Anuario Estadístico de América 
Latina y El Caribe, 2005, http://websie.eclac.cl/anuario_estadistico/anuario_2005/ (accessed August 1, 
2008). 
10 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2005 (New York, N.Y.: United 
Nations Publications, 2005). 
11 Guillermo O'Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems:  A Latin 
American View with Glances at some Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21, no. 8 (1993): 
1359. 
12 Robert H. Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central 
America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11. 
13 John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 26. 
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globalization have made it possible for even the most marginalized groups to pose a 
threat to the most powerful.”14  The potential threat to the United States from the 
implosion of Mexico or any Central American country should not be underestimated.  
2. Socioeconomic Ties 
In addition to its relevance for security, crime and violence also affect relations 
with Honduras and Nicaragua in that they deter investing in the area and discourage 
citizens from moving to these countries.  The State Department (DoS) reports that “U.S.-
Honduran ties are…strengthened by numerous private sector contacts, with an average of 
between 80,000 and 110,000 U.S. citizens visiting Honduras annually and about 15,000 
Americans residing there. More than 150 American companies operate in Honduras.”15  
Likewise the DoS reports that, “[t]here are over 100 companies operating in Nicaragua 
with some relation to a U.S. company, either wholly or partly owned subsidiaries, 
franchisees, or exclusive distributors of U.S. products. The largest are in energy, financial 
services, apparel, manufacturing, and fisheries.”16 
The administration of George Bush (1989-93), concerned with the prospect of 
failed states in the Americas and Caribbean, requested $1.1 billion for FY2008-2009 to 
fund the Mérida Initiative—a special program to combat narcotrafficking, transnational 
youth crime and terrorism in Mexico and Central America.17  Congressional review of 
the initiative led to an increase in the amount of aid requested for Central America, Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic from $50 million in FY 2008 to $100 million in FY 2009.18  
According to a 2009 DoS press release regarding the initiative, the $465 million that the  
 
                                                 
14 Theodore Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007), 11. 
15 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Background Note: Honduras,” U.S. State Department, 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1922.htm (accessed November 14, 2008). 
16 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Background Note: Nicaragua,” U.S. State Department, 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm (accessed January 5, 2009). 
17 Colleen W. Cook, Rebecca G. Rush and Clare R. Seelke, Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. 
Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America (Congress Research Service, 
2008). 
18 Ibid., 3. 
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U.S. Congress appropriated in mid-2008, “has already paid dividends in the form of 
increased arrests of major traffickers, record seizures of weapons, and reduced flows of 
drugs, guns and cash across borders.”19 
3. Enlightened Self-Interest 
Ascertaining the causes of Honduran internal security degradation is in the best 
interest of the United States.  Enlightened self-interest is not altruism.  It is sewn into the 
fiber of the international governing body; the “Charter of the United Nations” conveys 
that: 
To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and 
security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution 
of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to 
combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.20   
There is a strong incentive, therefore, to formulate a strategy for securing the region by 
determining the causes of violent crime in Honduras and the reasons for relative less 
violence in Nicaragua.  This thesis seeks to analyze the violence plaguing Honduras and 
identify those policies that contributed to better public security in Nicaragua. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW 
1. Causes of Violent Crime in Central America 
The 2007 UNODC report by Theodore Leggett, Crime and Development in 
Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, is the most recent and comprehensive study of 
crime in Central America.  It attempts to explain crime and violence in the region but 
does not account for the variation in homicide rates between Nicaragua and Honduras.  
Its general findings are applicable, however, to the two countries of this study.  
                                                 
19 U.S. State Department, “Western Hemisphere and Caribbean: Common Values, Shared Interests: 
The United States and its Promise in the Western Hemisphere,” State Department Documents and 
Publications, 2009. 
20 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed October 
24, 2008). 
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Additionally, Leggett aggregates variables broadly employed to explain violence.  This 
review is organized in accordance with those variables and brings subject matter to either 
expand or challenge Leggett’s assertions.  The UNODC report offers five explanations 
for Central America’s vulnerability to crime and discusses how crime is hindering the 
region’s development.  The five Central American vulnerabilities are as follows: 1) 
Geographical 2) Demographic, social, and economic 3) Limited criminal justice capacity 
4) Displacement and deportation, and 5) A history of conflict and authoritarianism.21   
a. Geographical Explanation 
First, Leggett’s geographical argument for Central America’s vulnerability 
to crime is due to its “misfortune of being placed between drug supply and drug 
demand.”22  Many scholars agree that there is a direct link between drug trafficking and 
criminal violence.  Michael Shifter, vice president for policy at the Inter-American 
Dialogue (IAD), represents the conventional view that drug trafficking is responsible for 
the increase in violence.  In his article for the journal Current History, he asserts that 
“[t]he politically motivated violence that wracked Central America in the 1980s has been 
replaced by burgeoning criminality at many levels, including transnational and local, 
much of it a product of illegal drug trafficking.”23 Max Manwaring from the Strategic 
Studies Institute warns that “[d]rug trafficking and mercenary activities become group 
rather than individual activities, and the gangs exploit both violence and technology to 
control their competition and absorb new markets.”24  
In addition to drugs, the proximity of Honduras and Nicaragua to the 
United States makes them a corridor for the trafficking of firearms and people.  The 
Mérida Initiative includes provisions for ion scanners and canine units for Mexico and 
                                                 
21 Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, 12-44. 
22 Ibid., 25. 
23 Michael Shifter, “Latin America's Drug Problem,” Current History 106, no. 697 (February 2007): 
61. 
24 Max G. Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil,” 
Strategic Studies Institute (2007): 19. 
 8
Central America to interdict drugs, arms, cash and persons.25  An unintended 
consequence of the globalization of labor has been an upsurge in the number of cases of 
coerced servitude.  According to the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, 
“in FY 2006, HHS [Health and Human Services] certified 234 foreign victims of human 
trafficking from a remarkably diverse array of countries.  Primary sources in FY 2006 of 
victims were El Salvador (62), Mexico (47), Republic of Korea (20), and Honduras (17).”  
Honduras is classified as a “Tier 2 Watch List” country on the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards ranking “for its failure to show evidence of 
increasing efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly in terms of providing 
increased assistance to victims. In addition, the absolute number of trafficking victims in 
the country is very significant.”26 In “Honduran-U.S. Relations,” Mark P. Sullivan puts 
government and NGO estimates at 10,000 victims trafficked, mostly internally, in 
Honduras.27  Nicaragua is a “Tier 2” country and not on the “Watch List,” meaning that it 
does not “fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards but is making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.”28   
The geographical explanation hinges on the disparity of economies 
between the United States and Central America.  The amount of money to be made in the 
U.S. black-market increases violent crime because participants do not resolve differences 
through standard nonviolent mechanisms, i.e., courts of law.  Additionally, combating 
illicit trade diverts criminal justice resources from deterrence of violent crime. 
b. Demographic, Economic and Social Explanations 
Leggett examines demographic, social, and economic vulnerabilities to 
account for high levels of violent crime in Central America.  According to his study 
“most street crime is committed by young men between the ages of 15 and 24, often 
                                                 
25 States News Service, “The Mérida Initiative: Proactive Border Security,” Newswire, December 1, 
2008. 
26 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report (Office for the Under Secretary for 
Democracy and Global Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, 2007), 112. 
27 Mark P. Sullivan, Honduran-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress (December 2007). 
28 Ibid., 29. 
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against their peers. The higher the share this demographic group comprises of the 
population, the greater the number of potential perpetrators and victims in the society, all 
other things being equal. 
First, violent crime is often attributed to economic factors.  According to 
Leggett, “studies of the correlates of crime have found that the distribution of wealth in a 
society is actually more significant than raw poverty in predicting violence levels.  It has 
been argued that stark wealth disparities provide criminals with both a justification 
(addressing social injustice) and an opportunity (wealth to steal) for their activities.”29  
Second, social violence, which Johan M. G van der Dennen, a researcher 
at the University of Groningen, defines as “the use of physical means by a social unit to 
deter, to punish, or to demonstrate superiority,” has also been submitted as underlying 
violent crime in Central America.30  Reinforcing Leggett’s concern for the social causes 
of violent crime, Caroline Moser and Cathy McIlwaine argue in “Violence in a Post-
Conflict Context,” that “[t]he complex relationship between violence and poverty has 
been widely debated.  However, social exclusion—the process through which individuals 
or groups are excluded from full participation in the society in which they live—may be a 
more useful concept because it involves a more dynamic and multidimensional 
conceptualization of deprivation.”31  In “Fractured Cities, Second-Class Citizenship and 
Urban Violence,” Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt make the causal link between social 
exclusion, (what they call a “failure of citizenship”), to “urban poverty, insecurity and 
violence.”32  They make the connection by stating that violence “seems to be the standard 
integration mechanism [into a society] of the poor and underprivileged.”33 
                                                 
29 Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, 12. 
30 Johan M. G. van der Dennen, “Theories of Political and Social Violence,” 2005, 
http://rechten.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/departments/Algemeen/overigepublicaties/2005enouder/A-VIOL/A-
VIOL.pdf (accessed February 2, 2009). 
31 Caroline Moser and Cathy McIlwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context: Urban Poor 
Perceptions from Guatemala (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001), 15. 
32 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, “Fractured Cities, Second-Class Citizenship and Urban Violence,” 
in Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America, ed. Kees 
Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London, New York: Zed Books, 2007), 12. 
33 Ibid., 21. 
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Ethnicity must be examined as a motivational factor due to its 
pervasiveness throughout history and the world. In Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Donald L. 
Horowitz attests to the dimensions of ethnically inspired violence: 
Ethnic violence since World War II has claimed more than ten million 
lives, and in the last two decades ethnic conflict has become especially 
widespread.  Ethnicity is at the center of politics in country after country, a 
potential source of challenges to the cohesion of states and of international 
tension.34  
Leggett rejects ethnicity as a vulnerability to crime because of “the extent of 
intermarriage in Central America.”35 
c. Limited Criminal Justice Capacity 
Leggett’s third reason for run-away crime rates focuses on Central 
American governments’ ability to force compliance of the law.  He writes that:  
The citizenry, large portions of which may have traditionally regarded the 
law enforcement apparatus as the enemy, also needs time to learn to trust 
and cooperate with those charged with protecting them. Lingering 
suspicions teamed with transitional hiccoughs may strain this trust 
relationship. Corruption can derail it altogether.36 
The justice and morality void left by state incapacity is often filled by vigilantes, gangs 
and other local power brokers.  These modern day “caudillos” or strongmen are not 
always content to merely lord over their respective areas and often push out violently 
resulting in clashes with the state.  Where the state tries to co-opt these forces, its 
legitimacy is called into question and the rule of law is reduced to an arbitrary standard of 
local preferences.  
d. Displacement and Deportation 
A significant Central American diaspora resulted in the United States from 
the Central American civil wars of the 1980s and 90s.  Leggett writes that “[t]here is a 
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widely held belief in both Central America and the Caribbean that recent crime troubles 
can be tied directly to criminal deportees.”37 According to Prensa Latina, “20,500 
Hondurans have been deported” from the United States to Honduras since January 2008 
and “1.1 million since 2000.”38  Many policymakers in Central America believe that the 
deportation of large groups of illegal immigrants, many with criminal backgrounds, 
overwhelms their justice capacity and further destabilizes the region.39 
e. A History of Conflict and Authoritarianism 
Leggett includes psychological trauma, warlike mindset, loss of state 
capacity and legitimacy, and police militarization as legacies of war.40  He suggests that 
“violence can become ‘normalized’ in communities where many people were exposed to 
brutality, and may be tacitly accepted as a legitimate way of settling disputes, particularly 
where the state continues to be viewed as incompetent, corrupt, or biased.”41  
2. Conclusion 
The UNODC report attempts to capture broad aspects of the Central American 
crime problem but does not analyze cross-country variation in manifestations of violence 
and possible causes of violent crime.  The result is a list of conditions that contribute to 
the problem of violence without being sufficient to account for the differences in 
homicide rates between Nicaragua and Honduras.  This thesis is in response to the 
shortcomings of Leggett’s UNODC report and will compare Honduras and Nicaragua to 
more accurately determine the factors that explain violent crime in the former and 
relative peace in the later.     
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a comparative study of Nicaragua and Honduras beginning with the 
Central American wars of the 1980s to determine what can account for different levels of 
violence manifest in both countries today.  “Violence,” is often divided between two 
causal motives: politically inspired and socially inspired.  War is the ultimate (although 
not only) political expression of violence. An examination of war is justified in a treatise 
on violence because as Holden contends, “the state has undoubtedly constituted the main 
arena within which the killing [during the twentieth century] took place, as the agents of 
states both contend and collaborate with their competitors and associates, both internal 
and external.”42  He continues by describing national separatist movements that operate 
“outside the state apparatus itself” and seek “political and military power” in order “to 
make their own state or control some space within the state.”43   
In a “Rationalist Explanations for War,” James Fearon lists five reasons generally 
accepted by scholars (which he rejects as insufficient) for why countries go to war. The 
causes of war as detailed by Fearon are, “(1) anarchy; (2) expected benefits greater than 
expected costs; (3) rational preventive war; (4) rational miscalculation due to lack of 
information; and (5) rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.”44  
Fearon’s list is useful in describing the causes of wars between nations like the 1969 
“Football War” between El Salvador and Honduras where, in this instance, both sides 
may have expected greater benefit than costs.  This kind of war is the exception in 
Central America; in the pan-America isthmus, civil war and rebellion are historically 
more common than war between two or more countries.  Honduras is unique in that it 
avoided civil war beginning in the late 1970s and concluding in the early 1990s while its 
neighbors were engulfed by it.   
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In Violence in Developing Countries, Christopher Cramer points out that statistics 
on violence must be viewed critically.  He explains that with regard to “political violence, 
armed conflict or even some forms of inter-personal or ‘social’ violence:”  
[T]he evidence on the incidence of, intensity of, and trends in violent 
conflict is typically unreliable. To find reliable data for social science 
research in most fields is hard enough, and especially so in poorer 
countries.  Violence compounds the problem.  Tattered and untrustworthy 
data affect the accumulation of case study material on individual 
countries, and compromise even more endeavors to make comparisons 
between cases.45  
Cramer identifies a range of problems with homicide reports including “errors 
accumulating in the police recording process, crimes reported to but not recorded by 
police…variations between countries in definitions of particular crimes, variations in 
levels of reporting and traditions of policing, and variations in the accessibility of the 
police.”46  Comparing violence across countries compounds the difficulties associated 
with different cultures, reporting systems, and incentives to portray a country as secure 
for businesses or tourist friendly.  With regard to the complexity of cross-country 
comparisons of homicide and criminal violence, Leggett writes that both the UNODC 
and Interpol conduct crime trends surveys that are designed to “standardize definitions of 
each crime type” but where data from both organizations are available on the same 
region, “they often disagree.”47  Additional problems relate to legitimate and illegitimate 
applications of violence. 
Despite the problems listed above, the UNODC report states that “[i]ntentional 
homicide figures are generally considered the most reliable indicator of the violent crime 
situation in the country, since, unlike crimes like robbery and assault, most intentional 
homicides come to the attention of the police.”48  The “United Nations Survey of Crime 
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems” goes further stating that “homicide 
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46 Ibid., 82-83. 
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levels from different countries provide a relatively reliable source of comparison [of 
global crime trends].”  And that “homicide is generally regarded as a good proxy for 
broader levels of violent crime.”49  This thesis utilizes intentional homicide figures as the 
most reliable measure of criminal violence in Honduras and Nicaragua.  The intent is to 
evaluate homicide rates in order to identify the underlying cause of higher percentages of 
criminal violence in Honduras.  
Focusing solely on homicides, however, does not completely depict the violent 
reality in Honduras.  The number of violent deaths per 100,000 for Honduras in 1999 was 
41 compared to 43 in 2006—hardly indicative of a sudden “explosion” in violent crime 
as many sources purport.50  Sebastian Huhn, Anika Oettler and Peter Peetz writing for the 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) question the validity of reports that 
declare that the “levels of violence in Central America are as high as, or even higher than 
at the times of state terror, insurgent action and war of the 1970s and 1980s.”51  They 
argue that “the ‘real’ level of criminal violence is mostly unknown.”52  Regardless of the 
temporal onset of increasing bloodshed, the Honduran people suffer disproportionately 
from criminal violence today relative to global trends.  The difference in homicide rates 
in Nicaragua and Honduras serve as a gauge to determine the dimension of the problem 
with other statistics on violent crime utilized as applicable.  By determining the factors 
that allowed for relatively less violence in Nicaragua, the likelihood that Honduras can 
reduce violent crime is increased. 
The thesis began by outlining the dimensions of the problem of criminal violence 
in Central America.  The question of why Honduran society is more violent than 
Nicaraguan was presented and the importance of Central American violence to U.S. 
national interests detailed.  The second chapter contests conventional explanations for 
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different crime levels in Nicaragua and Honduras.  The third chapter compares the 
availability of weapons, police responses and the emergence of social movements in 
Nicaragua at the end of the civil war to explain the marked differences in security 
compared to Honduras.  The fourth chapter emphasizes the importance of key differences 
between the countries and advocates policies to stabilize Honduras.  Factors determined 
to contribute to the favorable security environment in Nicaragua serve as the basis for 
recommendations.    
 16
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II. EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENT LEVELS OF VIOLENCE 
IN HONDURAS  AND NICARAGUA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers explanations for the emergence and persistence of violence in 
various contexts.  Theories that fail to account for key differences regarding homicide 
rates in Honduran society and that of its neighbors (particularly Nicaragua with other 
countries used occasionally for comparison) are challenged.  This review evaluates 
existing hypotheses for overall high crime in the Central American triangle (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras) in order to discern which factors contribute to high levels of 
violence in Honduras and relatively less violence in Nicaragua.  Honduras and Nicaragua 
are compared in order to highlight differences that help explain their current security 
environments. 
Is Nicaragua substantially less violent than Honduras?  Godnick, et al. writes, 
“there is probably an under-reporting of armed violence [in Nicaragua].  This under-
reporting may partially explain the homicide figures, which are low by regional 
standards, i.e., well below Nicaragua’s northern Central American neighbors and only 
moderately above those of Costa Rica.”53  Oettler asks to what degree is criminal 
violence “overshadowed by elite discourse of Nicaragua being a safe country?”54  Huhn, 
et al. lends credence to Oettler’s concern.  Their study of the two leading newspapers in 
Nicaragua exposed a bias toward reporting news geared to the majority of their readers, 
“the Managua of the wealthy.”55  They generalize that “violent crime is portrayed as a 
problem being generated and situated in the exterior.”56  
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Perhaps violent crime is underreported in Nicaragua but unlike Honduras, it did 
participate in the UNODC biannual crime trends survey (CTS) which was designed to 
overcome difficulties of cross-country analysis of homicide rates.  Honduras was the only 
Central American country that did not participate in the CTS.  This failure to participate 
may be an indication of an overwhelmed security apparatus.  Leggett suggests that 
unstable countries “are not able to provide reliable statistics, and it is precisely in these 
areas that the problems are likely to be the worst.”57  The “Observatorio de la Violencia,” 
a report from the Honduran Police and Public Ministry contradicts the rationale that they 
are simply unable to provide detailed statistics. On a quarterly basis, the report 
documents homicides and “violent deaths” in the country.  Another plausible explanation 
is that the Honduran government is covering up civil rights abuses and does not want an 
independent assessment of homicides.  In Honduras Again Validates its Banana Republic 
Status, Gena Goodman-Campbell maintains that there is a gap between law enforcement 
and the protection of civil rights in Honduras.  She states that the police are implicated in 
the death squads responsible for “extra-judicial execution of street children” and that 
“anti-gang measures and the 2001 Police and Social Order Law have made law 
enforcement less accountable, facilitating the detainment of suspected gang members by 
violence-prone police. Discrimination, unlawful detention and multiple police abuses 
occur as a result.”58 
Nicaragua is relatively less violent than Honduras.  Less violent should not be 
interpreted as an indication of an innate culture of peace, however.  Nicaragua, like 
Honduras, suffers from police abuse, lengthy pretrial detentions, overcrowded prisons 
and so on, the difference is in degree.  There are various ways to measure the outcome of 
criminal activity and violence in a society.  In polls conducted by the World Bank 
designed to reveal barriers to conducting business, 39% of Nicaraguan business firms 
ranked crime as a serious obstacle.59  Leggett puts this percentage in context reporting 
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that the figure is “higher than in countries in which the crime problem is widely 
recognized, such as Nigeria (36%).”60  Although Nicaragua does indeed have a serious 
problem with violent crime it pales in comparison to that of Honduras.  From the same 
World Bank poll, 61% of Honduran businesses rank crime as a serious impediment to 
commerce.61 Leggett again uses Africa to put this percentage into perspective relating 
that Honduras had “the third highest rate recorded (after Kenya)” out of 53 nations 
covered.62 
According to newspaper reports, Nicaraguan women suffer domestic violence to a 
much greater extent than the world average.  In a 2005 report for the Nicaraguan 
newspaper La Prensa, Roberto Solis writes that “Nicaragua could end the year with more 
than 11,000 cases of domestic violence…a rate of 190 (mostly women) per 100,000 
inhabitants.”63  He considers this level of violence to be a scourge reporting, “the World 
Health Organization (WHO) considers 10 cases of domestic violence per 100,000 a 
public health problem.  In Nicaragua we surpassed that figure by a multiple of 19.”64  
Despite these statistics on domestic violence and the business environment, intentional 
homicide statistics are generally regarded as the best indicator of widespread levels of 
violence in cross-country studies.65  Available statistics consistently show Honduras 
having a higher rate of intentional homicide than Nicaragua.  The 2005 homicide rate in 
Nicaragua was just eight homicides, compared to 41 in Honduras, per 100,000 people.66  
Nicaragua is ranked as the 60th most peaceful country out of 140 on the Global Peace  
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Index for 2008.67  The United States and Honduras by comparison are ranked 97 and 104, 
respectively, on the same index.  Based on the latest information, this paper concludes 
that Honduras does suffer more from violent crime and murder than Nicaragua. 
B. GEOGRAPHY AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 
1. Drug Trafficking  
The argument that drug trafficking is responsible for run-away violence is linked 
to the hypothesis that Central America serves as a drug corridor between Colombia and 
the United States.  The argument inevitably leads from drug smuggling to a myriad of 
destabilizing forces.  Max Manwaring, from the Strategic Studies Institute, demonstrates 
this chain of logic:  “Over the past several years, many decision-makers, policymakers, 
and opinion leaders seem to have been consistently surprised at the chaos, violence, and 
governmental degradation that stems from the destabilizing activities of gangs and their 
drug-trafficking allies.”68  Michael Shifter states that many of the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean “have weak states and are struggling to deal with severe 
strains that often stem from the drug trade.”69 Despite Shifter’s respected position at the 
IAD and the resources and regional connections at his disposal, he makes no attempt to 
substantiate his claim, and his article contains no citation whatsoever.   
This causal link between drugs and violence is challenged by research that 
suggests the drug trade mostly bypasses Central America.  Maureen Meyer, in 
collaboration with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), explains that in the 
mid-1980s, “major interdiction efforts by the United States effectively closed off Florida 
as an entry point for Colombian cocaine.”70  Rather than delivering a crippling blow to 
the illicit drug trade, the blockade had the perverse effect of empowering Mexican drug-
cartels.  She indicates that “[i]t is estimated that 70% of all drugs that enter the United 
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States pass through the hands of at least one of these organizations [the Gulf, 
Sinaloa/Federation and Tijuana cartels].  They control the flow of drugs within Mexico, 
as well as the transport of cocaine from South America.”71  Most studies on drug 
trafficking suggest that Honduras and Nicaragua are only transit points for drug 
traffickers and ones that are not used with great frequency.  The 2007 World Drug 
Report, for example, documents that: 
The share of large seizures in national seizure totals highlight the fact that, 
while smaller scale trafficking does take place, the backbone of the market 
remains in the hands of more sophisticated operators.  For example, in 
2004, more than 25 percent of the cocaine seized in Honduras came from 
just one maritime seizure, while 42 percent of that seized in Nicaragua 
came from two major seizures on the Atlantic Coast.72  
While it is true that Honduras leads the region in the number of state nationals arrested 
for drug trafficking in the United States,73 it is most likely that these were low-level 
“mules” transporting illicit drugs because they had nothing much to lose.  A recent news 
report concerning drug seizures and arrests in Peru states that “[o]ver three-quarters of 
Peruvian ‘mules’ are poor or unemployed.”74  That Honduras has the most arrests for 
drug smuggling is a greater indication of its level of poverty than a sign of local control 
of transnational drug routes.  A responsible approach to the possible linkage of drug 
trafficking and violent crime comes from Marcelo S. Bergman, a Professor at the Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City.  Bergman only allows 
that “[i]t is widely assumed that a dramatic surge in drugs and firearms accounts for the 
rise in criminality in the region, but the most we can say is that these variables are highly 
correlated.”75  
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The preponderance of data suggests that the Mexican and Colombian cartels 
control the drug trade and that Honduras and Nicaragua are only minor players.  Admiral 
Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, warns, however, that 
“narcotraffickers continuously adjust their operations to adapt to law enforcement efforts 
by developing new trafficking routes and consumer markets.”76  Regardless of the extent 
of trafficking through Central America, drugs can have an enormous impact on small, 
poor countries.  Bergman relates that “for violence the most consistent predictors of 
victimization are gender, age, and education, as well as proximity to drugs and 
alcohol.”77  The majority of Honduran gang members (65%) admitted to “always or 
sometimes” consuming drugs in interviews conducted by Demoscopía S.A., whereas 
100% of Hondurans not affiliated with gangs answered that they “never or almost never 
use drugs.”  In Nicaragua, only 29% of gang members and 4% of non-members admitted 
to frequent drug use.78 Not all violent crime is committed by gang-members.  If the 
survey is to be believed, the violence committed by ordinary citizens in Honduras is done 
so while sober.  The link between drugs and violence is tenuous.  
2. Human Trafficking  
According to the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, “violence and 
abuse are at the core of trafficking for prostitution.”79  Although competition to control 
human trafficking may resemble the fight to control any territory or illicit trade and result 
in homicides between factions, the victims of human trafficking usually suffer an extreme 
form of non-lethal social exclusion and abuse.  Violence as an instrument to coerce 
servitude may not be reflected in homicide rates because the value of the trade results 
from continued exploitation.  This thesis argues that slavery and human trafficking are 
manifestations of violence, however, and not causes of violence.  The trafficking in  
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humans, while particularly vile, is a form of criminal violence that results from the 
incapacity of the state to protect marginalized citizens and the failure of social networks 
to account for the most vulnerable of its members. 
3. The Weapon’s Trade 
Although this thesis argues that the availability of weapons in Honduras and their 
relative scarcity in Nicaragua is a central reason for the difference in homicide rates, the 
proposition that the trade in weapons is the cause of violent crime is challenged.  The 
geographic argument would suggest that economic disparities provide opportunities for 
Central America to manufacture cheap weapons and smuggle them into the United States.  
This is certainly not the case.  Manuel Roig-Franzai reports for the Washington Post, that 
2,000 U.S. weapons cross into Mexico each day80 and according to Lora Lumpe, in 
collaboration with the “Peace Research Institute,” “by all available evidence, the United 
States has been the leading source of small arms supply to Central America since the 
1950s and continues to be so today.”81  Contestation for control of the weapon’s trade 
cannot account for criminal violence in Honduras.  
C. DISPLACEMENT AND DEPORTATION     
While the links between migration and violent crime are subject to considerable 
debate, Leggett concedes, “there can be little doubt that the arrival of those fleeing war 
can be a major source of social strain in areas unprepared to receive them.”82  He 
explains that the danger of hosting displaced people is that they often arrive “traumatized 
and culturally disoriented with little money and no local connections.”83  They compete 
with the local population for resources and jobs, and as a result, often confront 
xenophobic exclusion and even violence from their hosts.  Moreover, migrants and 
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refugees often become more cohesive and mobilize as a defensive measure.  Leggett 
warns that over time, “defensive formations may mutate into predatory gangs, and cycles 
of conflict may become entrenched unless interventions are made.84 Honduras and Costa 
Rica were unique to the region in being recipients of displaced people from other 
countries though internal displacement appeared frequently throughout the region.  
Causal links between displaced populations and the incursion of criminality, however, 
cannot account for Costa Rica’s relatively low level (6.2 per 100,000) of intentional 
homicide.85   
There is a significant Honduran diaspora in Los Angeles, California 
(approximated at 36,576 Honduran nationals) which is renowned for its gang activity and 
culture.86  But their representation in Los Angeles is nearly identical to that of Nicaragua 
which has 37,731 nationals living in the city.87  According to the U.S. State Department, 
“[a]n estimated 1 million Hondurans reside in the United States, 600,000 of whom are 
believed to be undocumented.88  Collier warns that the danger of diasporas depends on 
the size of the displaced population in a rich country.  He calculates that “[i]f the country 
has an unusually large American [U.S.] diaspora its chances of conflict are 36%.  If it has 
an unusually small diaspora its chances of conflict are only 6%.”89  The reason for this 
trend, according to Collier, is that “diasporas sometimes harbor rather romanticized 
attachments to their group of origin,” and they are “much richer than the people in their 
country of origin and so can afford to finance vengeance.”  Most importantly, the 
displaced populations do not have to suffer the consequences of renewed conflict because 
they are not the ones taking up arms and are not living in the country.90 
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Remittances to Central America do not appear to finance rebel organizations like 
Collier details; however, Heidrun Zinecker, from the “Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt,” hypothesizes that remittances “create economic structures, which for reasons 
of deprivation or frustration suggest the use of violence as a way of accessing the market 
to those who do not receive remittances.”91  Zinecker is essentially making a structural 
argument (that inequality is more important than widespread poverty in predicting levels 
of violence) and saying that the unequal distribution of remittances formed a new 
economic stratification between those who receive remittances and those who do not.   
The vast majority of illegal immigrants entering the United States do so for 
economic opportunities.  Close to a fifth, however, are deported for violent crime.  In a 
Capitol Hill Hearing, Allison Parker, a senior researcher for the U.S. Human Rights 
Watch program, testified that recently released Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) data for 2005 shows “that 64.6 percent of immigrants were deported for non-
violent offenses, including nonviolent theft offenses; 20.9 percent were deported for 
offenses involving violence against people; and 14.7 percent were deported for 
unspecified ‘other’ crimes.”92  Leggett continues, “Honduras, which has a relatively 
small Census population in the United States, produces a disproportionately large 
deportee population.”93  If 20% of the 1.1 million people deported from the United States 
to Honduras since 2000 were convicted for violent crime that equates to 220,000 violent 
offenders entering the country in a period of just five years.  With regard to Nicaraguan 
deportees, Leggett writes that it “is greatly under-represented, receiving only 345 
criminal deportees in 2005.”94  He cautions deriving too much significance from these 
ratios, however, citing that “they are based on census data and may capture differing 
shares of the undocumented population between national groups.”95   
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Although there is no evidence that the Honduran diaspora is financing gangs as a 
form of rebel subversion, its recent history of “displacement and deportation” is 
significantly different from that of Nicaragua. Leggett concludes, “it is clear that 
deportees have had a major affect on Central American gang culture, but it is less clear 
whether they are responsible for recent increases in crime rates.”  
The relationship between the advent of gangs in Central America and deportation 
is also subject to debate.  In SAIS Review, Cordula Strocka argues that youth gangs 
existed in Central America before the era of large-scale migration to the United States in 
the 1980s and the widespread deportations that followed.  Although she concedes that 
U.S. gang culture has influenced Latin American gangs, she points out that return 
migration and globalization have had enormous impacts on Latin American culture in 
general. She argues that although maras have adopted violent techniques used by U.S. 
youth gangs such as drive-by shootings,  high-casualty gang warfare, and so on, that in 
Peru, for example, youth gangs have tended to adopt the non-violent aspects of North 
American youth culture, including hairstyles and outfits.96  In sum, her thesis is that 
“youth gangs in Latin America originated independently from their counterparts in the 
United States, but the contemporary manifestations of Latin American gangs are clearly 
influenced by U.S. street gangs and Anglo-American youth culture.”97   
Gangs in the United States and those in Honduras diffused culturally with regard 
to outward manifestation of gang affiliation (clothes, tattoos) and violent behavior.  They 
engage in high-visibility violence that is sensational and generates considerable alarm but 
represents only a small percentage of the total violence exhibited in Honduras.  This 
thesis argues that most acts of violence in Honduras results from distrust in the state’s 
criminal justice capacity resulting in vigilantism.   
                                                 




D. DEMOGRAPHICS AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 
Demographic factors are not sufficient to explain the pervasiveness of violent 
crime in Honduras.  José Miguel Cruz, director of the Institute of Public Opinion at the 
University of Central America, disagrees; he speculates that a high percentage of youth in 
the population may explain high gang activity and violent crime in Central American.98  
Although Leggett entertains the possibility of a link between demographics and violence, 
his statistics show that Honduras and Nicaragua are virtually identical concerning the 
percentage of young men in their populations.  In both countries, 11% of the population 
is comprised of men between the ages of 15 and 24.99  This age group is considered to be 
the most violent segment of society based on crime statistics.100  Since the percentages 
are the same, it is likely that there are other reasons why one group is more violent than 
the other.  Beyond percentages of age groups, some academics point to the percentages of 
unwanted births, births to broken homes or disadvantaged socioeconomic groups.101  In 
Understanding High Crime Rates in Latin America, Soares and Naritomi reference 
studies that show that “the legalization of abortion in the U.S. was one of the main 
reasons behind the reduction in crime rates observed in the 1990s” and that a similar 
argument “has been applied to the context of developing countries, specifically to the 
case of Brazil, to suggest that the increase in crime rates starting in the end of the 20th 
century was the result of reductions in child mortality rates in the low socioeconomic 
strata 20 years beforehand.”102  A sign that demographic factors are insufficient to 
explain the crime rate comes from research that according to Leggett “indicates that less 
than 5% of all crime in the country is committed by people under 18 years of age. This 
demographic constitutes a large share of mara membership.”103   
                                                 
98 José Miguel Cruz, “Street Gangs in Central America,” San Salvador: UCA (2007): 21. 
99 Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, 13 (graph). 
100 Ibid., 12. 
101 Rodrigo R. Soares and Joana Naritomi, Understanding High Crime Rates in Latin America: The 
Role of Social and Policy Factors (Harvard University: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 2007), 16.  
102 Ibid., 16.  
103 Ibid. 
 28
Concerning demographic ethnicity, Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew observe 
in their book Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, that “conflict specialists underscore the 
forces of ethnicity, ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and communalism” as 
factors that contribute to understanding “why internal wars were growing in number and 
intensity [in the 1990s].”104  Ethnic and religious tensions may be the causes of much of 
the violent strife throughout the world but it is unlikely that they motivate violence in 
Honduras.  According to the CIA “World Factbook,” Honduras is relatively homogenous 
ethnically with 90% of the population being identified as “mestizo (mixed Amerindian 
and European),” and 97% listed as Roman Catholic.105  In comparison, Nicaragua is 
more diverse with only 69% of the population recognized as mestizo and less than 60% of 
the population classified as Roman Catholic.106  The danger of ethnicity is described by 
Shultz and Dew as manipulation “by elites from various disadvantaged groups who wish 
to achieve their own political objectives.”107  Although ethnicity and religion cannot be 
completely ruled out as motives for violence, it is more likely that some other factor is 
responsible for run-away violence in Honduras. 
Violent crime is often attributed to structural conditions, i.e., poverty and 
inequality. Economic decline and unemployment are common legacies of war torn 
societies.  Collier calculates that “[b]y the end of the typical war the economy is about 
15% poorer than it would otherwise have been, and mortality is much higher, mainly due 
to disease triggered by movements of refugees and the collapse of public health systems, 
rather than combat deaths.”108  The end of hostilities often leaves many combatants on 
both sides armed, destitute and with no viable skills beyond military competencies, a  
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dangerous combination.  In his book The Bottom Billion, Collier describes a “conflict 
trap” where slow economic growth or decline following warfare fuel a vicious cycle of  
more fighting and continued decline.109   
Calculations in Economics of Development by Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, 
and David L. Lindauer of the Gini coefficient (used by economists to describe a country’s 
distribution of income) places Nicaragua in the range of “medium” inequality and 
Honduras on the list of countries with “high” inequality.110  However, other calculations 
of the Gini coefficient contradict Perkins’ findings.  Estimates in “The Political Effects of 
Inequality in Latin America” by Robert Kaufman show that wealth is slightly less equally 
distributed in Nicaragua (54.1) than Honduras (53.0).111  Given the similarity of the two 
countries, inequality in wealth distribution does not appear to be useful in explaining the 
difference in levels of violence.   
The causes of violent crime and the contemporary gang problem in Central 
America have been attributed to marginalized youth who find opportunity in criminal 
activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, 
extortion, and murder.112  This characterization is challenged by 2002 unemployment 
statistics for young men that indicate that there is a significantly higher incidence of 
unemployment in Nicaragua (20%) compared to Honduras (7%).113  The wild variation 
in employment statistics between Honduras and Nicaragua over time and between studies 
brings into question the accuracy of the figures.  Zachary Karabell, a business reporter for 
“Newsweek,” asserts that even statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Labor “aren't an 
objective measure of reality; they are simply a best approximation created by smart 
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people working for government agencies.”114  The similarities between the two country’s 
economies make it unlikely that structural factors are solely responsible for violence in 
Honduras.    
E. GANGS AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 
There is currently a great deal of alarmist hyperbole regarding youth gangs in the 
literature of “violent crime in Central America.”  Manwaring, who holds the General 
Douglas MacArthur Chair and is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War 
College, may be the most salient example of exaggerated journalism regarding the youth 
gang phenomena.  In his article “A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs 
and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil,” he posits the possibility of a “new type of war” against 
“first-, second-, and third-generation street gangs” whose “objective is to neutralize, 
control, or depose governments to ensure self-determined (nondemocratic) ends.”115  He 
believes that gangs “contribute to the evolutionary state failure process by which the state 
loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its fundamental governance and security 
functions.”116  He continues down a slippery slope conjecturing that: “Over time, the 
weaknesses inherent in its inability to perform the business of the state are likely to lead 
to the eventual erosion of its authority and legitimacy. In the end, the state cannot control 
its national territory or the people in it.”117  
At the other extreme, Strockaargues that “the proportion of violent crimes 
committed by youth gangs is far smaller than commonly claimed.”118  She blames the 
media for transforming young males into scapegoats, disproportionately crediting them 
for the majority of violence and crime.  She maintains that: 
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[T]he high visibility of gang-related crime and violence, resulting largely 
from sensationalized and disproportionate media coverage [is responsible 
for misperceptions].  Visibility is critical in shaping levels of tolerance, 
fear, and insecurity.  In much of Latin America, street battles, armed 
assaults, and robberies committed by youth gangs attract considerable 
attention.  In contrast, other forms of violence, such as domestic violence 
or child abuse, are less visible and therefore do not resonate as forcefully 
in the public’s consciousness.119   
Although she does not mention the physical appearance of the maras, it supports her 
theory of high visibility.  Many of the gang members are marked with an extravagant 
amount of diabolic-looking tattoos, to include permanently marking their faces.  As 
Robin Fox so eloquently elaborated in the journal, The National Interest, humans have 
the “imaginative and intellectual equipment of a terrestrial primate, evolved to be, among 
other things, especially sensitive to differences, and warlike about dealing with them.”120  
The menacing appearance of youth gang members may have as much to do with their 
infamy as their actual deeds.  
With regard to the link between gangs and transnational drug trafficking, Nielan 
Barnes, in collaboration with the Center for Inter-American Studies and Programs at the 
InstitutoTecnológico Autónomo de México and the Ford and Kellogg Foundations, finds 
that “while gang-related violence [in Central America] is a problem it is not tightly linked 
to narco-traffic and organized crime.”121  He bases his findings on scholarship conducted 
by a research network with links to universities and NGOs throughout Central America 
and Mexico that shows that “while a growing and complex problem, the transnational and 
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and international perceptions, he states that “only a small minority of gang members in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, possess transnational ties with other gang members, 
or ties with organized crime and/or narco-trafficking.”123   
Information regarding gang violence is notoriously unreliable but Leggett often 
treats estimates as if they were incontrovertible facts without delving into their origin.  
He cites OAS estimates, for example, that approximate the number of gangs and 
membership levels in each of the isthmus countries without giving any indication as to 
their reliability or methods used for calculation.  Dr. Thomas Bruneau, Distinguished 
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and leading 
expert on Central American gangs, disclosed in an interview that research on gangs is so 
problematic that estimates of the number of gangs are often devised through such dubious 
means as analyzing graffiti.  Apparently researchers, concerned for safety and 
understandably reluctant to address gangs directly, divine their numbers by counting what 
appear to be the names of gangs in the scrawl of spray paint on public walls and other 
surfaces. 
The decentralized leadership of Mara Salvatrucha, MS-13 and other Central 
American gangs combined with sensational journalism resulting from the Christmas bus 
attack in Honduras and high-profile murders in the United States makes objective 
analysis difficult.  What is certain, however, is that gangs are perceived as a serious threat 
to public security.  A survey conducted by Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica 
(IUDOP), found that 91% of El Salvadorans interviewed believed maras were a big 
problem.124  Prior to the 2005 presidential elections in Honduras, “STRATFOR” reported 
that “[r]ampant violence perpetrated by youth gangs—or maras—has become the most 
important campaign issue, replacing economic and social issues.”125 
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Koonings and Kruijt suggest that social exclusion or citizenship without citizen’s 
rights or duties, is key to understanding the gang problem in Central America.126 Cruz 
examines education as a socialization instrument and suggests that a lack of schooling is 
another explanation for the upsurge of gangs.127  Leggett, along the same line, surmises 
that “the most at-risk group [for committing crime] are young people who are neither in 
school nor at work.”128  He reports that “[i]n a national household survey of Honduras, a 
large share of the teenagers polled said that they neither work nor attended school, 
including 20% of the 13 to 15 year-olds and 28% of the 16 to 18 year-olds.”129  Despite 
poor attendance rates in Honduras, it appears that schools in Nicaragua are no better and 
perhaps worse.  Josefina Vijil, in a report for Revista Envío indicates, “21 out of every 
100 children” drop out of the first grade in Nicaragua “and never come back.”130  She 
continues that “[j]ust 50% of the children who enroll in primary school go all the way 
through the sixth grade.”131 UNESCO uses literacy rates as one factor to calculate their 
Education for All Development Index (EDI).132  Literacy rates in Honduras according to 
the CIA “World Factbook” are 80%.  This rate compares to just 67.5% in Nicaragua,133 
an indication that the two countries have poor education systems and that this factor 
cannot account for the different levels of violence. 
Attributing the prevalence of violence to the share of youth in the population of 
Honduras appears to be a case of “observational selection” where cases of youth violence  
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are extrapolated to infer causation of the preponderance of cases.  The comparison to 
Nicaragua illustrates that this associate of youth with crime is inconsistent and fails to 
explain the difference in levels of violence between Honduras and Nicaragua. 
F. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CAPACITY  
High levels of impunity encourage violence.  The problem is not just an issue of 
resources.  Leggett maintains that Nicaragua is “arguably the second safest country in 
Central America,” even though it has the “least law enforcement capacity…in terms of 
raw numbers.”134  Honduras on the other hand spends a large percentage of its national 
income on criminal justice but according to Leggett “fields a level of coverage not much 
better than Haiti.”135  According to a 2004 Latinobarometro survey, 66% of Hondurans 
(the highest percentage in the region) believe their government is winning the war on 
crime but statistics sharply contradict their optimism.136  Effective police action and 
efficient courts are vital to curbing violence but as the Latinobarometro survey proves, 
what constitutes successful measures to enact justice is often poorly understood.  This 
thesis will examine in greater detail the criminal justice system in Nicaragua to determine 
what aspects have been most important in reducing violence.   
G.  A HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
According to Cameron G. Thies, in his article “Public Violence and State 
Building in Central America,” the kind of wars a country experience shapes its 
government and national character.  Thies applies “bellicist theory” or the role played by 
war in state building, to explain the weakness of political institutions and authority in 
Central America.  He contends that bellicist theory expects wars to strengthen states by 
forcing them to mobilize and extract resources from their populations.137  Extraction in 
its most familiar form is collecting taxes but it may involve deficit spending, or even 
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nationalization of property.  Thies maintains that the process of developing institutions in 
order to “extract” from the polity enhances “the autonomy and capacity of the state over 
time… [and] eventually produces nations and a sense of communal identity.”138  
According to the theory, civil and interstate wars (as opposed to international wars) do 
not contribute to strong extractive institutions.  Since the preponderance of wars and 
large-scale military actions in Central America have been against internal foes, Thies 
concludes that armed conflict did not contribute to the development of a strong sense of 
shared national identity.139   
Although international wars have been infrequent in Central America, violence 
has been profuse.  To determine the extent of violence in the region and to overcome 
cross-country differences in reporting violent crime, the United Nations conducts 
biannual crime trend surveys (CTS).  The latest CTS data shows that “El Salvador and 
Guatemala rank among the most dangerous nations in the world for which standardized 
data are available.”140  That these countries are torn by criminal violence with homicide 
rates well above world averages is hardly surprising given the fact that both countries 
experienced civil wars in the 1980s that did not end until 1992 and 1996, respectively.  
Post-conflict countries are widely regarded as breeding grounds for violent crime.  
Leggett writes: “Violence can become ‘normalized’ in communities where many people 
were exposed to brutality, and may be tacitly accepted as a legitimate way of settling 
disputes, particularly where the conflict resolution mechanisms of the state are viewed as 
incompetent, corrupt, or biased.”141  High crime rates and violence are empirically linked 
with post-conflict societies that often have caches of left over weaponry, a government 
accustomed to resolving crises through brutal responses and communities characterized 
by distrust rather than cooperation.  While post-conflict explanations may account for the 
situations in Guatemala and El Salvador, they are insufficient to explain the divergent  
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rates of violent crime in Honduras and Nicaragua.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Honduras was 
not consumed by a civil war like its neighbors yet it has been plagued by high homicide 
rates in the past decades.   
Thomas Hobbes contemplated that “during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war, as is of every man, against every man.”142  Hobbes’ work can be interpreted as 
linking a weak central government with a failed public security apparatus to an 
“atomized” society characterized by a dearth of social capital.  A paper by the Institute 
for the Study of Labor suggests that “higher levels of social capital are associated with 
lower crime rates” and that “[s]ocial capital indicators explain about 10 percent of the 
observed variance in crime.”143  But in a study by Luis Rosero-Bixby, Andrea Collado, 
both from the University of Costa Rica and Mitchell A. Seligson from Vanderbilt 
University designed to measure “trust and community participation” in Central America, 
entitled “Social Capital, Urban Settings and Demographic Behavior in Latin America,” 
they found that Hondurans had more confidence in their neighbors than did the relatively 
low crime countries of Nicaragua or Panama respectively.144  These results conflicted 
with logical expectations and forced the authors to acknowledge that social capital is “an 
abstraction and a relatively new concept” and that “there is no consensus on how to 
measure it objectively.”145  Although there was a robust correlation between urbanization 
and social capital across-countries—rural areas consistently exhibited more trust than 
urban areas—this correlation conflicts with the hypothesis that “atomization” leads to 
crime considering that Honduras is less urban than either Nicaragua or Panama.146 
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Socially inspired violence is described by Marc W. Chernick in the book What 
Justice? Whose Justice?, as “intrafamilial violence and feuds, as well as violence against 
unwanted social sectors, including thieves, prostitutes, and homosexuals.”147  He refers to 
case studies of other countries to help explain widespread violence in Colombia noting 
that “data suggest a causal relation between political violence and crime and other forms 
of violence” and offers the examples of South Africa and El Salvador where “violence 
actually increased after the peace settlements in the 1990s, because political violence had 
weakened the legal state.”148  Chernick’s work shows that there is a fine line between 
politically inspired violence and socially inspired violence with the former often 
decomposing into the latter.149  
This thesis argues that “post-conflict” explanations have merit in elucidating the 
causes of violence currently manifest in Honduras if the definition of a post-conflict 
society is expanded to incorporate the situation in Honduras during the 1980s.  True, 
Honduras did not experience a civil war but it did host a foreign army, did receive large 
influxes of weapons, did suffer displaced people along its borders, did endure death 
squads, and did experience a militarization of its civilian government.  Additionally, 
Collier deduces that: 
[A] lot of the costs [of civil war] accrue to neighboring countries: both 
economic decline and disease spread across borders. Because the typical 
country has around three neighbors, all of whom are affected, the total cost 
to neighbors is about as large as the cost to the country itself. One 
implication is that most of the costs of a war accrue to either the future or 
to neighbors and so are not taken into account by those who start them.150  
Either the security situation that exists in Honduras today is independent of the turmoil of 
the Central American civil wars or the concept of what constitutes a post-conflict society 
must be expanded to incorporate Honduras.   
                                                 
147 Marc W. Chernick, “Colombia,” in What Justice? Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin 
America, ed. Susan Eva Eckstein, Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley (University of California Press, 2003), 
201.  
148 Ibid., 210. 
149 Ibid., 201; He acknowledges that “[t]he correlation between political violence and other forms of 
violence needs to be studied further.” 
150 Collier, Economic Causes of Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 16. 
 38
Zinecker states that violent crime in Honduras “has nothing whatsoever to do with 
civil wars, revolutions or other armed conflicts.”151  His dismissal of a post-conflict 
explanation does not address the availability of weapons which others believe to be a 
direct legacy of the Central American civil wars. Although Honduras is often excluded 
from the list of post-conflict societies, the Contra war was fought primarily along its 
border with Nicaragua.  William Godnick, et al., directly contradict Zinecker’s 
assessment in Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America 
writing: 
Available data suggests that social violence and armed criminality are on 
the rise in the aftermath of the conflicts that have plagued most countries 
of the region. In the early twenty-first century, politicized factions that 
fought in the 1980s are giving way to criminal gangs and organized 
civilian militia groups that are taking advantage of left-over military-style 
weapons, including grenades. Disenfranchised ex-combatants and 
unemployed or otherwise marginalized male youths are easily recruited 
into such groups.152 
Additionally, Godnick et al. maintain that “[a]t least until July 2001, Central American 
authorities continued to find abandoned or hidden arsenals—remnants of civil wars—
especially near San Salvador in El Salvador and Managua in Nicaragua. Military assault 
rifles and grenades continue to spread throughout society.”153  
Leggett includes psychological dimension to the list of causes of belligerence in 
post-conflict societies writing:  “Violence can become ‘normalized’ in communities 
where many people were exposed to brutality, and may be tacitly accepted as a legitimate 
way of settling disputes, particularly where the conflict resolution mechanisms of the 
state are viewed as incompetent, corrupt, or biased.”154 Although psychological 
dimensions may have a supporting role in the current levels of criminal violence it is  
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difficult to measure social capital and the results of the study by Rosero-Bixby, et al. are 
somewhat inexplicable with the more dangerous Honduran society exhibiting more 
“trust” than the less dangerous Nicaragua and Panama.155 
H. CONCLUSION 
Douglas Kincaid relates in “Demilitarization and Security in El Salvador and 
Guatemala,” that the analytical task for scholars of the region has traditionally been to 
“identify the mix of variables that might simultaneously explain Costa Rica's democratic 
stability, Nicaragua's revolution, civil war in El Salvador that was not quite a revolution, 
Guatemala's insurgency and repression that was not quite a civil war, and none of the 
above in Honduras.”156  Identifying such a formula is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Certainly drugs, gangs, poverty, and unemployment aggravate an already overburdened 
criminal justice system but these issues are symptoms of a sick society and not the overall 
cause of high levels of violence in the Central American triangle.     
Subsequent sections compare the availability of weapons, police responses, and 
the emergence of social movements to explain the substantially different levels of 
violence in Nicaragua and Honduras.  The manner in which the Central American civil 
wars ended—internationally monitored demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
(DDR) in Nicaragua compared to withdrawal and neglect in Honduras—begins to explain 
the ready availability of illicit weaponry, social exclusion, and human rights abuses in 
Honduras.   
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III. VIOLENCE AND SECURITY  
A. POST-CONFLICT EXPLANATION FOR NICARAGUAN SECURITY  
1.   International Oversight 
The international community’s focus on Nicaragua during the Contra War surged 
toward the end of hostilities and not only made disarmament possible but paid dividends 
toward efforts to decrease weapons in what was a thoroughly militarized country.  The 
International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was established in a 
collaborative effort between the United Nations and Organization of American States 
(OAS) in August of 1989 to assist in the voluntary demobilization and resettlement of the 
Contra rebels.157  During an emergency summit in San Isidro, Costa Rica in December 
1989, representatives from the five Central American governments demanded that all 
remaining U.S. aid to the Contras be transferred to CIAV and requested that the United 
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) expand its mandate from 
monitoring aid and sanctuary given to opposition groups to supervising cease-fires and 
separating combatants.158  The newly elected Bush administration, eager to distance itself 
from the Iran-Contra scandal, was amenable to these demands.   
The election of Violeta Chamorro as president of Nicaragua in 1990 marked not 
only the end of the Sandinista Revolution but indeed the end of the Contra War.  The 
victory for democracy negated the ideological raison d’état of the Contra insurgency.  
Subsequently there were 22,000 Contras, 72,000 members of the Sandinista Popular 
Army (EPS) and 5,100 members of the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) demobilized—a 
total that exceeded the number of Nicaraguans employed in agriculture, industry and 
commerce combined in 1991.159  UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar successfully 
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petitioned the Security Council to deploy an infantry battalion to Nicaragua under the 
auspices of ONUCA to provide security for demobilization centers and oversee weapons 
disposal.160   
2. Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) 
Many scholars deem the DDR effort under Chamorro a failure because the 
administration did not keep its land promises to ex-combatants, but this thesis argues that 
the forces were successfully reintegrated.  Although soldiers from both sides of the 
Contra War rearmed in order to press their claims against the government and caused a 
great deal of instability in the countryside, the rearmed soldiers did not destabilize the 
peace in the short run nor did they contribute significantly to crime rates in the medium to 
long run.  This outcome stands in stark contrast to instances of failed reintegration of 
demobilized soldiers and police in Honduras and other countries like Bosnia, East Timor, 
Haiti and so on, where violent crime has increased and plagued societies emerging from 
conflict. 
The re-polarization of marginalized soldiers along economic lines was defused by 
the Chamorro administration’s dual policy of incorporating sectors most likely to threaten 
the state and military subjugation of more radical elements that resorted to violence.  
Ultimately, the problem of the destitute ex-combatants—the Contras (or Recontras) and 
the marginalized former soldiers from the Ejército Popular Sandinista or EPS (Las 
Recompas), as well as a third insurgency on the part of peasants comprised from both 
armies (called the “Revueltos,” Spanish for scrambled) was addressed. Despite the poorly 
managed DDR process, the ex-combatants were eventually reintegrated into post-1990 
Nicaraguan politics or re-incorporated into Nicaraguan society more generally.  
Moreover, the contributions to social capital by NGOs that proliferated at the end of the 
conflict filled the void in government services created as neoliberal reforms took effect.  
The role of NGOs and social networks are considered in greater detail in section C. 3.   
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3. Reform of the Military and Police in Nicaragua 
From 1989-1996, all the countries of Central America, to include Costa Rica and 
Panama, reduced their militaries.  The transformation of the military in Nicaragua from a 
coercive apparatus of the Sandinistas to a security organization subordinate to the 
legitimate control of the civilian government was not foreordained.  In Repression, 
Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America, Richard Stahler-Sholk writes 
of the turmoil surrounding the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas:  “The suspension of 
armed conflict and introduction of competitive elections did not resolve the structural 
causes of revolution, including highly unequal distribution of land and wealth and 
concentrations of unaccountable power in the hands of elites and their representative 
agents.”161  The reintegration of former combatants into civil-society was less than 
successful because of unrealistic promises of land distribution, a bad economy, and 
delays in receiving foreign aid.   
The Nicaraguan police were ill equipped to handle the precipitous rise in post-
conflict criminal violence as groups of former soldiers rearmed.  In Comparative Peace 
Processes in Latin America, Rose J. Spalding describes the situation:   
Those few who remained in the police force were badly equipped for the 
job.  The scarcity of resources for an overburdened police force plus the 
general weakness of the court system meant that arrests were low and 
convictions were rare.  This gap between victimization and conviction 
fostered vigilante actions and a privatization of the justice system, 
particularly in the interior parts of the country where state penetration was 
weak.  The result was a spiral of violence that the state had difficulty 
controlling and that threatened the country’s already fragile peace.162  
In spite of this unpromising beginning, Nicaraguan civil-military relations 
improved dramatically during Chamorro’s administration.  Ruhl surmises that elites were 
kept in check and the military controlled through “domestic political pressure, the 
influence of the United States, and pragmatic military [to include the police] 
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leadership.”163  The EPS, which heretofore had complete legal autonomy from civilian 
authority, severed its ties to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and 
accepted the legitimacy of Chamorro’s presidency.  It proved its nonpartisanship by 
working to contain pro-Sandinista labor strikes and fighting former EPS soldiers 
(Recompas).  The break between the military and police was demonstrated during 
Arnoldo Alemán’s presidency (1997-2002), when the military refused the president’s 
request that they assist the police in suppressing public disturbances.  The military’s 
senior leadership cited constitutional limitations on the use of military force in a law 
enforcement capacity.164  
The Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) was born from the Sandinista Police.  In 
“Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua,” José Luis Rocha, a 
researcher for the Jesuit Service for Migrants of Central America (SJM) speculates that 
the Nicaraguan state overcame loyalty issues regarding its coercive forces through 
personal connections at the highest echelons of the police force to both the traditional 
elites and the FSLN  Approximately half of the police leadership were members of the 
traditional elite who became involved in law enforcement after the Sandinista Revolution 
and continued working in this capacity even after the election of Chamorro. This element 
responded to concerns of the elites with regard to civilian security.  According to Rocha, 
they perceived citizen security as “one of the national priorities that contribute to the 
attraction of foreign investment.”165  With the end of the Sandinista revolution and the 
political fragmentation of the executive and legislative bodies, the NNP, according to 
Rocha, was forced to seek legitimacy through “its battle against the rising crime rate, 
protection of the private sector, and support for governmental decisions.”166  Concern for 
investment and by extension for security coincided with the interests of the Nicaraguan 
state and presumably strengthened its coercive capacity.  
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The other half of police leadership was what Rocha called “the Sandinismo 
faction” who attended to the FSLN’s base of support.167  Rocha credits this faction with 
the NNP’s unique approach to youth gangs.  Specifically, he believes that the FSLN’s 
strategy was “to keep close contact with the groups that have proven to be valuable in 
supporting student and transportation strikes.  The proximity to youth gangs and the 
possibility to involve them in riots is essential for Daniel Ortega’s project to govern from 
below by mobilizing the party’s social base.”168  Although Rocha attributes the 
elite/FSLN amalgam of police leadership with the transformation of the organization 
from a counterinsurgency group to a law enforcement apparatus, he ultimately criticizes 
it for perpetuating a mentality of “human rights versus citizen security,” clientelism, and 
corruption.169  
While Rocha’s criticisms are not without foundation, compared to its neighbors 
the NNP has performed admirably.  It has kept homicide rates almost equal to Panama 
with a force of just 163 police per 100,000 citizens compared to Panama’s 500 per 
100,000.170  Additionally, the NNP has an 81% “clearance rate”—the percentage of 
crimes that result in a suspect being identified—versus just 44% for El Salvador and 7% 
for Guatemala.171  For the above reasons, Leggett maintains, “Nicaragua’s police and 
prison system are regarded by some experts as the best in the region.”172  
4. Social Movements and the Church 
In “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Terry Karl writes, “elite 
factions and social movements seem to play the key role in bringing about the demise of 
authoritarian rule…and business associations, trade unions, and state agencies become 
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major determinants of the type of democracy that is eventually consolidated.”173  In “A 
Study of Civil Society in Nicaragua,” Axel Borchgrevink calls the years 1979-1990 in 
Nicaraguan history the “revolutionary decade” which he describes as a “period of popular 
organization par excellence.”174 During this time, the FSLN’s focus on popular 
participation helped mobilize the Nicaraguan people in order to implement social policies 
and development efforts.  Hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans were members of 
organizations created under FSLN auspices such as the farmers’ organization (UNAG) 
and the workers’ confederation (CST).  One of the largest examples of organized civil 
society were the CDSes [Comités de Defensa Sandinista], which claimed 600,000 
members in the mid-eighties, while the other organizations together totaled around 
250,000 members. These movements formed the organizational structure for many of the 
impressive revolutionary efforts within health and education, such as vaccination and 
literacy campaigns.175  Spalding notes, “[a] host of organizations and programs in 
Nicaragua emerged in the post-war period to promote the development and broad 
dissemination of conflict mediation skills.”176  Between 1990 and 1997, there were over 
1,600 NGOs granted legal status in Nicaragua.177  
The proliferation of social movements that recognized the dangers of social 
exclusion contributed to divergent outcomes in the rates of criminal violence between 
Nicaragua and Honduras.  The “social capital,” defined as “the relationship of trust, 
social networks, civic and voluntary organizations that have been found to be related to 
differences in democratic practices, poverty, equity and general government 
performance,”178 fostered by social movements was a factor that prevented the rampant 
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spread of violence on the scale of that in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.  
Borchgrevink highlights the fact that many of the social movements “fulfill the watchdog 
functions toward the state,” while others serve as social safety-nets.179  Rocha, in an 
article for Revista Envío, describes the Nicaraguan organization CEPREV or the Violence 
Prevention Center, as a group that tackles “the culture of violence” by transcending “the 
merely informative and aim[s] to treat psychological issues such as human relations, 
maternity, paternity, gender and machismo, contributing to people’s emotional 
growth.”180 
Borchgrevink excludes the influence of religious groups from his study on 
Nicaraguan civil society arguing that the “report’s conclusions would not have been 
significantly different if we had included the religious organizations.”181  His dismissive 
attitude toward the unique influence of religion on Nicaragua’s present day governance is 
surprising considering the role the Catholic Church played during demobilization 
following the Contra War and its place within the Chamorro administration.  In 
Nicaragua without Illusions, Andrew J. Stein writes that “Church officials have seen a 
legitimate role for themselves to guide and shape public debate; and even though the 
Chamorro period was one of relative less conflict than the 1980s, bishops were very 
assertive on a number of issues.”  According to Stein, the foremost issue for religious 
leaders was reversing Sandinista educational policies.  They attributed increased 
manifestations of “hatred, cruelty, ambition, injustice, and criminality” to “years of 
atheistic education and a systematic and persistent campaign against Catholic morality.”  
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importantly, it championed social causes affecting the poor, government transparency, 
and accountability for past human rights abuses as it continued to monitor the drawdown 
of military forces.182   
According to Andres Perez-Baltodano in “Unholy Alliance,” despite “the rapid 
expansion of Protestantism” in Nicaragua, the Catholic Church “continues to exercise 
enormous influence in a country whose political culture is dominated by a predominantly 
religious vision of politics and power.”183  However, the effectiveness of Church efforts 
(Catholic and Evangelical) to impede violent crime is unclear.  Barnes writes that Church 
“prevention programs can sometimes be highly sectarian and so may generate 
fragmentation of gang prevention and rehabilitation programs instead of promoting the 
reconciliation and the coordination of efforts to avoid the practices of violence, drug 
consumption and delinquency in the long term.”184  He indicates that “Sectarianism is 
also generated by competition for scarce resources; many programs are small and 
resource-challenged and unable to respond to the magnitude of need.”185  
5. Availability of Weapons 
The National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the U.S. President to secretly arm 
covert military operations provided that they are vital to national security. In 1981, 
President Reagan used this provision to provide covert support for paramilitary 
operations against the Sandinistas and delivered millions of dollars’ worth of arms and 
ammunition to the Contras.  The majority of the weapons were Soviet-type manufacture 
confiscated from PLO forces by the Israelis in 1982-1984 and transferred to the CIA 
through clandestine channels.  By utilizing Soviet weapons, the Contras could draw on 
ammunition captured from the Sandinista army and the United States had plausible 
deniability with regard to the entire operation.  Although the exact number of weapons 
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the CIA supplied is unknown, a memorandum addressed to former CIA director William 
Casey in 1984, suggests that it was substantial.  According to NISAT, the memorandum 
discusses “a pending delivery of 10,000 Kalashnikov AKM assault rifles, 200 RPG-7 
rocket launchers, 200 60 mm mortars, 50 82 mm mortars, 60 12.7 mm machine guns, 50 
SA-7 portable surface-to-air missiles [Man-Portable Air Defense Systems—MANPADs], 
and related ammunition.”186 
Smith and Durch write that, “[t]oward the end of June [1990], the Contras turned 
in their best weapons—shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (119 altogether).”187  But in 
“Breaking the Cycle of Violence,” Alexander Chloros, et al. points out that “since the 
Contras did not provide detailed information regarding exact numbers of weapons and 
war-related material in their possession, it is difficult to assess what percentage of arms 
were collected and destroyed.”188  Although the number of weapons imported into 
Nicaragua may never be known, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR), an autonomous institute within the United Nations that conducts research on 
disarmament and security, provides the following table of weapons destroyed by 
ONUCA from April 10 to June 29, 1990. 
 
Table 1.   Weapons collected and destroyed in Nicaragua and Honduras189 
Weapon Type Nicaragua Honduras Total 
Small arms 14,408 512 14,290
Heavy machine guns 2 2 4 
Mortars (includes light arms and medium mortars) 106 28 134 
Grenade launchers (includes RPG-7s and LAWs) 1,182 83 1,265 
Grenades 740 570 1,310 
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Weapon Type Nicaragua Honduras Total 
Mines 134 4 138 
Missiles 82 30 112 
Total 16,654 1,229 17,883
 
It is not uncommon for weapons to remain in hidden caches following the end of 
hostilities as bargaining chips or due to a lack of confidence in the peace process. A stock 
pile of anti-aircraft weapons by the Nicaraguan army resulted in the United States 
suspending military assistance to the country. The State Department reported in 2003 that 
Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolaños assured U.S. leaders that Nicaragua would destroy 
all of its MANPADS.190  Although many were destroyed, “Jane's Intelligence Review,” 
reported in March 2005 that the discovery of 1,000 remaining black market MANPADS 
in Nicaragua reinforced anxieties about weapons proliferation in Central America.191  A 
2008 report in the Nicaraguan newspaper “Prensa Latina” by Ludwin Loáisiga López 
quotes current Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega justifying the need for the weapons in 
case of an air assault by Colombia over the disputed San Andres Island.192  Although 
U.S. military aid was restored after assurances from the Nicaraguan military that the 
missiles were adequately secure, the United States continues to seek their destruction. 
MANPADS are conspicuous weapons used by militaries; their continued presence 
in Nicaragua is not indicative of the weapons used to commit violent crime.  The 
Honduran Policía Preventiva and the Ministerio Publico, do not differentiate between 
pistols and rifles in their quarterly reports on violence but they do separate homicides 
committed with “las armas de fuego,”—firearms, from homicides committed with bladed 
weapons, strangulations and so on.  According to the report, firearms were used in 77.8% 
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of the cases of homicide in Honduras between January and March of 2008.193  The first 
indication that Nicaraguan attitudes toward firearms are substantially different from its 
neighbors and that advances have been made in reducing their availability comes from 
international treaties on disarmament.  While other Central American countries have 
signed the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons,” Nicaragua ratified the treaty in 2000—Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras have yet to do so.194  Furthermore, unlike Nicaragua, Honduras never 
ratified the “Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons 
Acquisitions,” and although Nicaragua and Honduras signed the “Inter-American 
Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and other related Materials” on the same day, Nicaragua 
ratified the treaty in 1999, five years before Honduras.195  Section III. B. 4. covers the 
availability of firearms in Honduras in greater detail.       
B. POST-CONFLICT EXPLANATION FOR RAMPANT VIOLENCE IN 
HONDURAS 
1. An Absence of International Oversight 
International attention, specifically post-conflict institutional reconstruction, and 
societal rehabilitation in Nicaragua and the lack of such programs in Honduras explain to 
some degree why Honduras has a high incidence of criminal violence today. The 
generally favorable security environment in Nicaragua is a result of concerted local, 
national and international efforts to control the number of weapons circulating in country 
and to subordinate the police and armed forces to civilian control.  Additionally, the rapid 
increase in the number of social movements following the counterrevolution in Nicaragua 
was instrumental in dealing with post-conflict problems such as unemployment, 
displaced persons, and social exclusion.   
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Inversely, the problem of violent crime in Honduras is related to the availability 
of weapons, the lack of social capital and the ineffectiveness of police forces—all post-
conflict legacies.  Because Honduras was not considered a post-conflict society, its 
military was not disarmed under the auspices of an internationally sanctioned inspections 
organization, and its police were neither inspected by the international community nor 
pressured to reform to the same degree as in Nicaragua.  Yet Honduras suffered many of 
the same problems as Nicaragua resulting from its unique role in the civil wars taking 
place all along its borders.  Grass root organizations were occupied with reforming the 
military and did not organize around social issues to the extent of Nicaraguan groups.     
Honduras, over the same time period as Nicaragua (1989-1996), demobilized only 
2,000 people from their 20,000 man armed forces.196  The incomplete subordination of 
the Honduran armed forces (which until late 1997 were responsible for internal security 
and police functions) led to a breakdown in law enforcement and distrust in government 
institutions.  Disaffected citizens ultimately contributed to the spiraling effect of high 
levels of violent crime by privatizing security and frequently resorting to vigilante justice.  
2. The Honduran Military Past to Present 
An examination of the military’s foundation is necessary in order to understand 
why Honduran society suffers proportionately from violence compared to global 
averages—the Honduran Constitution of 1957 is the obvious starting point.  According to 
Barry and Norsworthy: 
The Constitution of 1957 eliminated civilian authority over the military, 
transferring ultimate control of the institution to the chief of the armed 
forces who was given the right to disobey presidential orders that he 
considered unconstitutional.  This formal authority provided legal basis for 
political independence and autonomous institutional development of the 
military and set the stage for its subsequent incursions into all areas of 
national affairs.  This process has been facilitated by the traditional 
atomization and weakness of the Honduran political parties, state, and 
oligarchy.  In much of the countryside, local military commanders wield 
more influence than civilian authorities.  In many remote areas the army is  
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the only representative of the central government.  At the national level 
the military established itself as the ultimate arbiter of disputes between 
rival political, social, and economic forces.197   
Efforts to reign-in the military and gain control of police forces by creating a “Liberal 
Guardia Civil,” resulted in a military coup in 1963, military government (with a respite 
of civilian rule 1971-1972) until 1982, and the dissolution of the Guardia Civil in favor 
of a new national police force, the Cuerpo Especial de Seguridad (CES).  The police 
forces were transferred to military-controlled defense ministries with military officers 
occupying senior positions of command. Kincaid writes that “at the outset of the period 
of authoritarian military regimes, Central America was already characterized by policies 
that prioritized the security of the national state over public security, or, more accurately, 
that identified public security with the security of the state.”198  Ruhl writes that the CES 
“became the fourth branch of the armed forces and played an important role in silencing 
opponents of the authoritarian government.”199 
In 1982, a new constitution was completed and Honduras ended ten years of 
military rule with the inauguration of civilian president Roberto Suazo Córdova.  
Norsworthy and Barry write that the Honduran military retained “the essential elements” 
of its autonomy from civilian authority in the new constitution which allowed it to enter 
into “all areas of national affairs.”200 The restoration of civilian rule in 1982 coincided 
with the Reagan administration’s counterrevolutionary efforts to overthrow the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua.  Honduras was utilized as a staging area and safe 
zone for the U.S.-backed Contra rebels to launch attacks into northern Nicaragua.  The  
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increase in U.S. military aid to the Honduran armed forces strengthened them 
significantly relative to the civilian government and allowed the military to pursue its 
own political agenda, relatively unimpeded.   
In Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America, Adam 
Isacson writes that even though the armed forces in Honduras “expanded less than those 
of its neighbors in the 1980s, they nonetheless doubled in size and improved markedly in 
equipment, training, and weaponry.”201  Mark P. Sullivan, in a 2006 Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress states that “[i]n the 1980s, the United States 
provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid [to Honduras] as the country 
struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts.”202  The military’s power grew 
proportionately resulting in a country dominated by its armed forces and only nominally 
democratic.  The danger to state-society relations vis-à-vis the strengthening of a weak 
government’s military capabilities with foreign capital is that the military may become 
independent from the society it ostensibly serves.  The Honduran armed forces in the 
1980s had free reign to define their defense posture.  The military prepared to defend 
against “internal subversion,” and to contain Guatemalan, El Salvadoran or Nicaraguan 
revolutionary forces from entering the country.  The focus on internal security is alleged 
to have degenerated into paranoid death squads like Battalion 3/16, a secret Honduran 
military unit blamed for the disappearance of leftist activists, including students, teachers, 
unionists, and suspected guerrillas.  Until the early 1990s, the Honduran government and 
civil-society were too weak to contest the military’s power.  
a. The Challenge to Military Authority 
With the end of the Contra-Sandinista war and the transition to President 
William Clinton’s administration in the United States, perceptions of national security 
threats from Central America changed and brought an end to the large military-aid 
programs that dominated the U.S. approach in the 1980s.  Military assistance in the form 
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of grants or loans to Central American states stopped except for some counter-narcotics 
programs.203  Around the same time, the Honduran military came under siege from 
human rights activists.  In 1991, the case of an 18-year-old student named Riccy Mabel 
Martinez, who was raped and murdered, allegedly by high-ranking military officer gained 
national attention and was a pivotal moment that changed the power dynamics between 
the government and the military.  The ghastliness of the crime and sympathy for the 
victim galvanized Honduran society to the point that the military, which heretofore had 
been insulated with impunity, was unable to shield its personnel from civil authorities and 
was forced to turn over the accused officers to civilian courts.  Ruhl writes that when the 
armed forces submitted to the public’s will, “fear of the military, the source of its power 
over civil society, gradually began to dissipate.”204 
In December 1992, in response to public outcry concerning the military’s 
involvement in human rights abuses and criminal activity, Rafael Leonardo Callejas 
(Honduran President from 1990 to 1994), appointed Leo Valladares, a respected 
professor of law and a human rights activist, to the new post of Human Rights 
Commissioner.  Valladares uncovered information that implicated the Directorate of 
National Investigations (Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones or DNI), which acted like 
a secret police, and the Fuerza de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP) in a series of unsolved 
homicides and other serious crimes that further damaged the military’s reputation.205  In 
1994, Carlos Roberto Reina became President of Honduras promising to reform the 
country’s largely autonomous armed forces.  He reduced the military budget from $50 
million in 1993 to $35 million in 1996 as Honduras continued the neoliberal reforms of 
the prior administration and adjusted to the post-cold war reality of declining  
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international importance.206  In “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin 
America,” Charles T. Call documents the extent of Honduran demilitarization during this 
period:  
By 1996 the size of the Honduran Armed Forces dropped from roughly 
20,000 to an estimated 12,500, the smallest in Central America outside of 
Belize, and its budget dropped from $59 million in 1990 to $35 million in 
1996. The U.S. drastically reduced its military aid from almost $500 
million during the 1980s to less than $1 million per year from 1994 to 
1997.  These events significantly weakened the material and political base 
of Honduras' armed forces.207 
Reina tempered his confrontational rhetoric toward the military with prudent acts 
designed to placate its leaders.  He won concessions from the military, implemented 
civil-military reforms, and asserted his constitutional right to command the armed forces. 
Additionally, he excluded the armed forces from policy decisions on non-security-related 
issues and reduced their role in foreign policy.  According to Ruhl, the ending of 
obligatory military service, despite determined opposition by the military, was Reina's 
most popular achievement.208  The military’s power was further eroded by the disbanding 
of the DNI, the creation of a civilian controlled Public Ministry, and the ratification of a 
constitutional amendment mandating the transfer of the police to civilian control.209  
Additionally, the military lost control of the Merchant Marine, HONDUTEL—Honduras’ 
telecommunications system—and the Department of Immigration.210  On December 16, 
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and transferred it to civilian control. Call describes Honduras’ degree of success in 
“civilianization of an internal security system without a war transition” an “empirical 
anomaly.”211  
Others question the degree to which the Honduran military is subordinated 
to civilian control.  In Rethinking Military Politics, Alfred Stepan creates a framework for 
categorizing civil-military relationships.  He refers to “military prerogatives” as control 
of state enterprises that allows for “latent independent structural power,” and dubs the 
ability of a military to resist the edicts of a democratic government “contestation.”212  
The reduction in the Honduran military’s power resulting from constitutional changes 
and demobilization did not end a moderate to high degree of contestation. While the 
Honduran military accepted many of the Reina administration’s reforms, a 1997 report 
for the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) 
claims that it contested “budget cuts and the prosecution of armed forces’ personnel for 
past human rights abuses.”213  According to testimony from Valladares, the army 
continued to employ its intelligence organizations “to blackmail and control some 
political sectors,” frustrating investigations into human-rights abuses allegedly committed 
by the military.214   
Because the military continues to control the Instituto de Previsión Militar 
(IPM) or military-pension institute, it maintains a high degree of autonomy.  According 
to the IPM’s website, it runs the country’s armory, an international finance corporation 
(COFINTER S.A.), a mortuary business with multiple locations (Funerales San Miguel 
Arcangel S.A. de C.V.), a real estate company (Administradora de Valores e Inmuebles 
S.A.), the Honduran military academy (Liceo Militar del Norte), and most troubling from 
the stand point of separating domestic law enforcement from military prerogatives, a 
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private security firm (SECORP).215  Military autonomy combined with prerogatives 
corresponds to a “near untenable position for democratic leaders” in Stepan’s 
framework.216  He warns that a polity in this position is in danger of “a breakdown of 
democracy.”217  
Holden criticizes Stepan for representing the military as “a somewhat 
separated or even alien body.”218  He argues that by stressing the benefit of civilian 
control of the military, civil-society’s innocence concerning violence is exaggerated.  He 
cautions historians studying violence to “draw into their research civilian bureaucrats, 
professional politicians, judges and their collaborators (within or outside the institutional 
boundaries of the state) and various contenders for state power, including self-proclaimed 
popular liberators, whose armies could only claim they had better reasons than others to 
kill.”  He concludes that democratization is not sufficient to overcome a “culture of 
violence” which he defines as “the family, school, social relations and communications 
media” that reinforce other manifestations of violence.219   
In the introduction to the book Who Guards the Guardians and How, 
Bruneau affirms that in a democratic country, civil-military relations “involve ongoing 
conflict, negotiation, and compromise between those who hold power by virtue of free 
and fair elections and the organizations to which society has granted a monopoly on the 
means of violence.”220  Although the concentration of power in the hands of the military 
without a system of checks and balances is dangerous, the focus on the subordination of 
the military and police forces in Honduras without greater regard for the effectiveness of 
the criminal justice system and defense of the rule of law resulted in disillusionment with 
democracy and high incidents of violent crime.  Violent crime increased in anticipation of 
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the transfer of military leadership to civilian authorities.  Call explains that “[c]ivilianized 
internal security can coexist with human rights abuses, politicized policing, ethnic 
exclusion, corruption, and private justice” and that “significant demilitarization does not 
guarantee the eradication of state torture, extralegal killings, and other violations of the 
law and due process.”221  
b. The Breakdown in Law Enforcement 
Isacson writes that violence in Honduras began increasing noticeable 
around 1994.  He continues: “Honduran military officers state that attempts to 
demilitarize the police and to reduce the security forces are responsible for the growth of 
crime.  However, as in Guatemala, many blame rising crime on a military reaction to 
recent losses in power and prestige.”222  Human rights activists, the business community, 
and religious leaders responded that former and present members of the armed forces 
were behind the crime wave.  The IRB report compiled cases of suspected military 
involvement in kidnappings, assaults, rapes and even holdups.  It speculated that military 
involvement in crime was not only a result of unemployment and crimes of opportunity 
by destitute former soldiers but that crime was part of a plan to justify the reconstitution 
of the armed forces to their prior strength.   
In a 1997 interview with the Honduran newspaper Diario Tiempo, Dr. 
Ramón Custodio López accused the armed forces of kidnappings and assaults.223  He 
went further to say that the military continued to operate death squads like Battalion 3-16, 
suspected of disappearing “at least 184 people during the 1980s.”224  In an apparent case 
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the head of the Armed Forces in Honduras, General Hung Pacheco, requested a court…to 
order the arrest of Ramón Custodio.”225  The general accused Custodio of forging 
documents implicating him in the “disappearance” of a student.226   
As the May 1998 deadline approached for transferring the Honduran 
national police from military to civilian authority, Valladares and others accused 
elements of the armed forces with increasing human rights abuses and conspiring with 
organized crime in order to foment chaos and impede the transfer. 227  In January of 2001, 
the Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights reported that more than 1,000 
street children were murdered in the preceding year by death squads backed by the 
police.228  Amongst allegations that the military and police were complicit in murder, the 
inauguration of Ricardo Maduro Joest as President of Honduras in 2002 marked a shift in 
Honduran civil-military relations.  Maduro’s first act in office was to deploy a joint 
police-military force to widen neighborhood patrols in the ongoing fight against the 
country's massive crime and gang problem.229  Maduro’s focus on crime was personal; he 
lost a son in 1997 to a botched kidnapping attempt.  His government passed reforms to 
the penal code that allowed the prosecution of individuals up to 30 years for “illicit 
association,” or membership in a youth gang.230  The legislation had the unintended 
consequence of further overwhelming the country’s prison system and granting the police 
carte blanche to use excessive force and engage in extra-judicial actions.   
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3. Social Movements and the Church 
The chronicle of social movements in Honduras is quite different from Nicaragua.  
Popular organizations were repressed by the police and military beginning with peasant 
groups in the 1960s and continuing to at least the late 1980s.231  Notwithstanding 
government oppression there was a “meteoric rise in the number of NGOs operating in 
Honduras” in the 1980s according to Tom Barry but unlike Nicaragua, the increase in 
these organizations was “almost totally attributable to [the U.S. Agency for International 
Development] AID.”232  He asserts that USAID did not promote pluralism and that most 
its development funds went to groups focused on “entrepreneurship, export production, 
or paternalistic community development.”  He laments that “grass-roots peasant 
associations, militant trade unions, progressive development organizations, and human-
rights groups,” were excluded from funding.233 
Hondurans did organize around human rights but the focus was on curtailing the 
autonomy of the military. According to Ruhl, with the exception of the Comité de la 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CODEH), Honduran citizens did not challenge the 
military until a more open political climate began to emerge in the wake of the Cold War 
in the 1990s.  During this time, students, unions, business associations, human rights 
organizations, and the Catholic Church mounted a unified political attack on the armed 
forces as fears of reprisals subsided.234 
The Freedom House survey Countries at the Crossroads 2007, reports that “[t]he 
status of civil society in Honduras remains tenuous. While social movements and other 
groups are allowed to operate, they complain of onerous registration requirements and 
government interference in their work.”235  The lack of support for social movements in 
Honduras is striking. Compared to Nicaragua, where according to Zalaquett and 
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Wheelock, from their 2004 study of Nicaraguan police reports for the Arias Foundation 
for Peace and Human Progress, “the [1998] National Assembly and the President of 
Nicaragua” sought to arrest the general trends of youth violence and delinquency by 
implementing “the Youth and Children’s Code (Law 287) regulating comprehensive 
protection for children and adolescents through families, society, the government, and 
private organizations.”236  Additionally, article 70 of the Code seeks to mitigate the 
danger of miscreants by preventing “store owners and the general public from selling 
firearms, explosive devices, clasp knives, knives in general or any sharp object to 
children and adolescents.”237   
Quite the opposite situation exists in Honduras where according to Raudales; 
judges from the Juzgado de Letras de la Niñez (Honduras Children’s Court) determined 
that a direct relationship exists between “social risk and youth crime… [but] the system 
provides no alternative to put an end to the resulting chain of youth crime.”238  Instead, 
Honduras implemented “a wide legislative reform program to expand government power 
and restrict a number of basic rights” in order to “criminalize youth by identifying maras 
as the major source of crime and, thus, the number-one enemies of the Honduran 
population.”239  Cruz states that the result of draconian programs designed to oppress 
gangs “was that the gangs redesigned their modus operandi, reorganized themselves into 
more hierarchical, vertically rigid, and violent structure, and began to recognize gang 
leadership, which led to formal contact with other gangs and with organized crime as 
well.”240  
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4. Availability of Weapons 
Evidence suggests that weapons are less available in Nicaragua than in Honduras 
and that this may account for differences in homicide rates.  Because Honduras did not 
suffer a civil war, the disarmament efforts of ONUCA were aimed at the Contra rebels 
operating inside Honduras and not the Honduran military.  In the wake of the Iran-Contra 
scandal it was revealed that Israel and other countries were supplying weapons to the 
Contras through Honduran territory, the extent of which is not known but the trade was 
characterized as an “arms supermarket.”241  The disparity of weapons destroyed in the 
two countries combined with the fact that the Contras operated and were supplied in 
Honduras suggests that the United Nations effort to disarm the insurgents was not only 
incomplete but also disproportionate.   
Honduras continued to amass a stockpile of weapons even after the Esquipulas 
Peace Accords that ended the Central American Civil Wars.  From 1991-1999, Honduras 
spent $230 million importing weapons compared to Nicaragua’s $170 million (Table 
2).242 
Table 2.   Importing of Weapons: Arms Imports in Millions of Dollars  
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According to the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), 
between 2000 and 2006, Honduras imported $10,742,575 worth of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW), parts, and ammunition compared to Nicaragua at $7,152,717.  NISAT 
tabulated its data based on custom’s information provided by the individual Latin 
American and Caribbean countries.  The information is subject to underreporting and 
misreporting but gives a general indication of the difference in SALW trade between the 
two countries.243 
The Honduran military controls the sale of all weapons entering the country 
through the national armory.  It has an incentive to sell weapons rather than control their 
distribution.  Leggett corroborates that in Honduras, “the Military Pension Institute has a 
monopoly on firearms retailing in the country, and high ranking military officers have 
been implicated in several arms trafficking scandals.”244  Reina Rivera, the president of 
the Centre for Research and Promotion of Human Rights (CIPRODEH) in Honduras 
maintains that “[a] high percentage of the country’s economy is spent on weaponry: 
between 2000 and 2003 more than $22 million was spent on the importation of arms and 
ammunition [estimate conflicts with the NISAT report].”245  Furthermore, she states that 
“between the years 1979 to 1999 the national armory reported sales of 88,337 weapons, 
mostly handguns, pistols, rifles and shotguns, and between the years 2004 to 2005 they 
sold some 10,266 firearms.”246  The number of weapons sold through the armory may 
pale in comparison to the illegal trafficking of arms.  Rivera claims that some authorities 
estimate the number of weapons illegal purchased in Honduras to be around 600,000.247   
                                                 
243 Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer, “The Balance in Balance:  Exports and Imports of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Parts, and Ammunition in Latin America and the Caribbean 
2000-2006,” En La Mira: The Latin American Small Arms Watch 3, no. 23 (August 2008).  
244 Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, 68. 
245 Reina Rivera, Taller cuatro-nacional “Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Panamá: Tráfico y 
control de armas de fuego,” Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Fundación Arias, 2006, 





Firearms were implicated in 71% of homicides in Honduras from 1995-1999.248  
A study of Tegucigalpa by Julieta Castellanos, a professor of Sociology at the 
Universidad Autónoma de Honduras, found that 82% of homicides committed in that city 
involved firearms.249  A parallel study of Nicaragua by Elivra Cuadra and Maribel 
Padilla, for the Centro de Estudios Internacionales found that “[t]he number of crime 
cases involving firearms is not significant in relation to total cases.”250  Zalaquett and 
Wheelock report that sharp weapons, home-made arms and contusive weapons are more 
likely to be employed during an assault than firearms.251  The use of improvised weapons 
is an indication that firearms are not readily available in Nicaragua.  
The destruction of arms following the end of the Contra War partially accounts 
for the difference in the type of weapons utilized in the two countries.  Leggett confirms 
that “[o]ver 100,000 firearms were destroyed in that country [Nicaragua] following the 
cessation of hostilities.”252  The Nicaraguan government capitalized on progress made 
toward disarming the Contras and Sandinistas and continues to offer periodic weapon 
buy-back programs.  In February of 2005 they passed Ley (Law) 510, which regulates 
firearms, explosives and munitions and establishes harsh penalties for the illegal traffic 
and use of weapons.253  The law instituted two government run foundries where 12,752 
firearms in police custody were destroyed in 2007.254  The disarmament process 
continues to reduce the availability of firearms—a Nicaraguan National Police report  
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proudly boasts that on May 7, 2008 a weapons buy-back program destroyed 1,397 
weapons of various types and that Nicaragua “is the first Central American country to 
accomplish a voluntary weapons buy-back event consistent with Law 510.”255  
Tensions between the United States and Nicaragua have been growing since the 
election of Daniel Ortega in 2007. In addition to the MANPAD issue, Nicaragua re-
established diplomatic ties with Russia and plans to update its military arsenal with 
Russian assistance.256  Nevertheless, progress with regard to weapons destruction 
continues.  In an article for “La Prensa,” Eduardo Cruz Sánchez, confirms that since 
2005, Nicaragua has destroyed 12 thousand 996 weapons with the support of private 
enterprise and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).257  Rivera explains 
that unlike in Nicaragua, “[t]he regulation of weapons is a relatively new activity in 
Honduras. The effort is considered weak because the government has failed to achieve an 
effective policy on the possession and use of weapons in the country, whether held by 
individuals (including those for private security) or for use by the military and police.”258  
The availability of weapons combined with a high level of impunity and what the 
Honduran Department of Forensic Medicine of the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ) 
describes as “imbedded customs of revenge, conflicts between criminal bands and 
drunken brawls” have led to high rates of homicide.259 
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C. SECURITY AND VIOLENCE 
1. Police Operations 
The most evident expression of government policies against violent crime are 
police operations.  In “Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of 
Violence, Injustice and Insecurity,” Charles Call writes that:  
Police in many countries (Nicaragua and Costa Rica are exceptions) 
continue to patrol mainly in large groups in the back of pick-up trucks, 
rather than circulating and interacting with members of a specific beat.  
High levels of violent crime together with extremely high on-duty death 
rates for police officers have contributed to a sense of distrust among 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran police toward the population.260   
Consistent with this military approach to law enforcement, in January 2008, Honduran 
police and army troops conducted high-profile operations in the main towns of almost all 
of the country’s 18 departments to reduce violent crime.261  The Honduran operation was 
designed to show that criminal violence can be countered with force.  Many critics worry, 
however, that military responses to crime often result in human rights violations and 
actually strengthen gangs and organized crime.   
Lainie Reisman, the Director of the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention 
of Violence, represents this concern for human rights in the face of militarized law 
enforcement: 
In El Salvador, Honduras, and to some extent the United States, tough 
legislation has been passed targeting gang members through illicit 
association laws, mandatory minimum sentencing for young offenders, use 
of the death sentence for gang-related offenses, prosecution of juveniles as 
adults for gang-related crimes, and gang-racketeering laws.262 
She continues: “Anti-gang initiatives have become mired in controversy. Human rights 
and service organizations in the region recognize that gang violence is a very serious 
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problem but also note that gangs are now blamed for virtually all crime, leading to an 
increase in human rights and due process violations.”263  In “Central America: Why Do 
So Many Civilians Have Firearms?,” Cruz worries that “Hard Hand and Zero Tolerance 
programs that have dominated security policies in Honduras and El Salvador…have 
insisted on promoting a type of civic participation based on vigilance and spying on 
neighbors rather than resolving problems through community dialogue.”264 Strocka 
traces the implementation of these repressive polices back to New York City’s “zero 
tolerance” approach in the 1990s and finds tough-on-crime campaigns to be “largely 
ineffective, if not counterproductive.”  She concludes, “despite repressive government 
action, violence has been escalating at an alarming rate in all of Latin America.”265 
Custodio was elected as the National Commissioner of Human Rights by the 
Honduran National Congress in March of 2002, succeeding Valladares.  During his 
administration, 68 prisoners died in a jail at El Porvenir, on Honduras's north coast.  
According to “New York Times” reporter Tim Weiner,  “[a]n independent investigation 
concluded that 51 of the dead at El Porvenir had been executed –shot,  stabbed, beaten or 
burned to death—by the state police, soldiers, guards and prisoners working as 
trusties.”266  In 2004, another 103 prisoners, most believed to be gang members, were 
burned to death or died of smoke inhalation in a severely overcrowded prison in San 
Pedro Sula, Honduras.  In response, humanitarian organizations like Committee of 
Families of the Disappeared and Casa Alianza blamed the government for the prison 
deaths asserting that systematic abuses have resulted from policies that focus solely on 
the detention or elimination of gang members without regard for rehabilitation.267  From  
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2005 to 2006, Custodio served as president of the Central American Council of Human 
Rights Commissioners where he continued to lash out at Honduran police for “carrying 
out…unwarranted executions of presumed mareros.”268 
The situation in Nicaragua, in contrast, is less antagonistic.  Barnes writes that 
“because of the relative lack of availability of arms (guns) in Nicaragua and the work of 
community-based police, youth gangs are less violent than are gangs in the Northern 
Triangle [of Central America].”269  Oettler examines Nicaraguans’ favorable impressions 
as to the state of security in their country and suggests that if there is a general consensus 
that a country is secure (even if that perception is shaped by elite discourse) then 
aggressive tactics by police would be deemed unnecessary by the majority of the 
populace.270   
2. Politically Inspired Murders 
The U.S. State Department (DoS) 2008 Human Rights Report: Honduras states 
that “[w]hile observers linked some killings to high-profile targets, such as 
environmentalists, labor leaders, attorneys, and politicians, to organized crime and 
narcotics traffickers, other cases were apparently politically motivated.”271  To date, 
intimidation and retaliation are the modus operandi of Honduran politics.  In September 
of 2008, Luis Javier Santos, former Regional Coordinator in the Anti-Corruption Section 
of the Public Prosecutor’s Office was gunned down after indicting the mayor of San 
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for his security but despite being assigned a bodyguard, he was shot four times driving 
home from work.272  There were 17 legal professionals killed in Honduras as of July 2008 
(before Santos’ murder) according to the DoS report.273  
The Honduran Ministry of Security reported that there were 268 police officers 
prosecuted “for offenses ranging from abuse of authority to drug trafficking, rape, and 
homicide.”274  Most disturbing, the DoS report details how two plainclothes National 
Police officers were caught with a list entitled “dangerous,” with the names of 130 
leaders from civil society.  The paper was an apparent “hit-list,” and had the name 
Altagracia Fuentes, a slain labor leader, crossed-out and marked “dead” in the column.275  
In contrast, the DoS 2008 Human Rights Report for Nicaragua states, “The government 
or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings.”276 
3. The Privatization of Security  
The collective action of Honduran civil-society and the state perpetuated a culture 
of violence and vigilantism. Cruz asserts that in Honduras: 
[T]he use of firearms is part of a system of values and norms in which 
arms are socially acceptable and to some degree admired. This 
relationship to weapons in turn responds to a cultural system that permits, 
accepts and values the use of force and violence as part of the way 
members of a community relate to each other. It is, in other words, a 
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But he offers little explanation for the origin of this attitude toward weapons and violence 
in general other than to say that, “[w]hether this fondness for firearms is recent or born 
out of the development or perhaps even the end of the military conflict is up for 
debate.”278   
A culture of violence can be born out of distrust in state security institutions.  In 
Honduras, the increase in crime coupled with a lack of confidence in the organizations 
designed to defend and protect appear to have created a vicious feedback loop breaking 
the “social contract” between state and civil-society. Holden calls civil-society in general 
“the incubator of public violence,” and contends that states and militaries initiate violence 
which generates a violent response.279  In other words, violence breeds violence and 
neither the state nor civil-society is solely responsible for high homicide rates, rather, the 
tension and dynamics between these two cleavages is often at the center of violent crime.     
The mindset that Honduran society is responsible for its own safety is at the 
foundation of the government.  The constitution declares, “every Honduran citizen is 
obliged to defend the Fatherland” and encourages “the people,” to rise up “in defense of 
the constitution.”280  The Nicaraguan constitution, in contrast, emphasizes “friendship 
and solidarity among the people and the reciprocity among the States,” and declares 
aggression, for a multitude of reasons, to be “inhibited and prohibited.”281  The Honduran 
Constitution’s emphasis on self-protection is similar to the importance given to militias in 
the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The obvious difference is that 
Honduras transitioned relatively late to democracy.  Karl states, “[d]uring regime 
transitions, all political calculations and interactions are highly uncertain.”282  The 
absence of predictability can lead individuals to privatize security. 
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Koonings and Kruijt follow the transformation of Central American militaries 
during the 1990s into a “shadow presence.”  According to Koonings and Kruijt, the 
withdrawal of military government has been accompanied by “private vigilantism” which 
they characterize as: 
[P]rivate police, privately paid street guardians in the middle-class and 
even the working-class metropolitan districts, private citizens’ serenazgos 
(nightwatch committees or private protection squads), special forces in the 
financial sector recruited from former police forces or the army, extra-
legal task forces, paramilitary commandos, death squads, and so on.283    
Honduran President Manuel Zelaya Rosales (2006-present) is attempting to 
mitigate criminal violence by co-opting the trend toward private security.  His efforts 
may worsen an already bad situation.  His initiative to combine the police, armed services 
and private security into one security body, called Operation Thunder (Operación 
Trueno), is the latest version of the failed policy of utilizing the military to perform police 
operations.  According to Eytan Starkman, writing for the Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs (COHA), Zelaya intends to curtail crime by utilizing private security forces 
whose trustworthiness is questionable.284 Goodnick et al. report that in October 2000, the 
Honduran Ministry of Defense ordered “all private security companies to turn in machine 
guns, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and semi-automatic pistols” obtained illegally.285  
“The first company to comply” continues the report, “turned in 33 illegal weapons and 
others followed suit.”286  Starkman worries about the “many ex-military and ex-police 
officers who were dishonorably discharged or fired from their former institutions for 
rogue behavior… [and] then almost immediately hired by private security companies.”287 
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The privatization of security challenges the common perception of the state as the 
dominant force in society.  Nation-states normally have constitutions that formalize rules 
that were legislated through adversarial review whereas private security may try to 
enforce a moral code that does not recognize nor tolerate diversity.  Questions of 
accountability, the overlap of public and private security and jurisdiction can diminish the 
legitimacy of state government.  An essential problem with privatized security is that it is 
often difficult to distinguish between vigilantism and crime.  In order for a homicide to be 
deemed “self-defense,” for example, the defendant must prove to a jury that they acted in 
congruence with the level of the threat and that the threat was “current, immediate, and 
unavoidable.”288  Failure to convince the jury results in a criminal indictment for murder.   
Kees and Kooning ask how long can the outsourcing of law enforcement to non-
state actors maintain the existing economic, social and political order in Latin 
America.289  Their question assumes an order that Holden argues never existed.  He 
believes that the formation of the Central American states was characterized by 
“improvisation” or the requirement that governments “attract and keep collaborators—
above all, those without which the government was impossible, the fuerzas armadas or 
‘armies without nations.’”290 Honduras will continue to exhibit high rates of criminal 
violence unless the government can assert sovereignty, dominate the legitimate use of 
force and coerce its constituency to obey the rule of law.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A.  POLICE, GUNS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  NICARAGUA 
In her 1996 autobiography, Dreams of the Heart, Violeta Chamorro related that: 
Since 1990 violence has been in steady decline.  But it is by no means 
eradicated.  There is great poverty.  There is still a lot of social tension.  
People blame my administration.  But government is not entirely to blame.  
Poverty, unemployment, and violence are things we must combat 
together.291 
A year later, the Nicaraguan philosopher Alejandro Serrano Caldera wrote critically of 
the continued violence in his country comparing it to a roulette wheel where “violence is 
recurrent with some spaces in which the shooting stops and temporary political 
arrangements arise which, inadequate in their scope and spurious in their intentions, open 
the way once again to violence and the culture of confrontation and the bullet.”292 On 
Nicaragua’s uncertain, “roulette wheel” path to democracy it managed to reduce the 
number of weapons circulating within its cities, develop social movements that 
incorporate otherwise excluded segments of society and reform the police force from a 
political tool of the FSLN party to a functioning organization that discourages crime.  
These three factors are principally responsible for the transformation of Nicaragua from a 
“culture of confrontation and the bullet” to a country that exhibits less criminal violence 
than almost anywhere else in Central America. 
The Chamorro administration’s concentration on economic stabilization and the 
integration of Nicaragua into the world market often came at the expense of social 
programs the Sandinista Revolution had inspired.  Fortunately, international sympathy for 
the objectives of the revolution led donors to support the rise in social movements taking  
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place during this time.  Domestic and international civil society organizations, religious 
groups, and the media have played an invaluable, “ombudsman” role, in protecting 
human rights and deterring violence in Nicaragua. 
The bifurcation of the highest echelons of the Nicaraguan National Police, 
between networks of traditional economic elites and members of the FSLN (another 
revolutionary legacy), resulted in a sort of duality of law enforcement.  The twin pillars 
of law enforcement correspond to the dichotomy of Nicaragua’s polarized society.  The 
NNP serves the traditional elites by concentrating on citizen security with the ultimate 
goal of projecting an image of Nicaragua as a safe place for foreign companies and 
individuals to invest capital.  This unique relationship between the state and the 
traditional oligarchy that according to Oettler, “exercise political influence via informal 
channels and the media” has brought into question the veracity of reports that claim 
Nicaragua exhibits minimal criminal violence.293  These concerns are allayed, in large 
part, by objective research by the United Nations and Interpol that show Nicaragua to 
have the lowest homicide rates in the region after Costa Rica.  
In her memoir, Chamorro wrote of the political advantage of having Daniel 
Ortega “assume the leadership of the enraged masses.”294  She professed that “it gave us 
a central figure to negotiate with and not a cornucopia of warlords each with his own 
agenda…given the power he has over the masses, he could have been worse.”295  Ortega 
and the FSLN’s representation of the “economic have-nots,” (if nothing more than “lip 
service”) is somewhat unique in Central America and lends further credence to the 
hypothesis that social exclusion and “second class citizenship” are at the core of 
expressions of criminal violence.  The FSLN segment of the National Police leadership, 
administering to their party’s social base, recognized the disadvantages of “zero-
tolerance” policies and opted instead for rehabilitative programs.296  
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Finally, the weapons buy-back program in Nicaragua is a good example of a 
deterrence measure that is non-confrontational and utilizes information rather than 
coercion to affect enforcement.  It seeks to educate the at-risk segments of society as to 
the consequences of violating weapons laws and then offers a way to avoid prosecution.  
Gun buy-back programs have been criticized for rewarding criminals for possession of 
illegal weapons and driving the illicit weapon trade by liquidating old and obsolete 
weapons to purchase new ones.  These problems can be surmounted, however.  To 
disrupt market forces Nicaragua offers to buy-back weapons at irregular intervals with 
specific end dates.  The impression of amnesty is problematic but considering the already 
high-levels of impunity throughout Latin America, the benefit of eliminating weapons 
that perpetuate violence may outweigh the often unsuccessful prosecution of justice.  
B.  POLICE, GUNS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  HONDURAS 
Crime and corruption undermine democracy by destroying the relationship of 
trust between political leaders and their constituents.  Police in a democratic society must 
solicit community interaction and not rely on intimidation as in authoritarian regimes. In 
his book The Lesser Evil, Michael Ignatieff prescribes “open government” as a panacea 
for sick societies.  He explains that: 
Democratic peoples will not lend assistance to authorities unless they 
believe in the system they are defending.  No strategy against terror is 
sustainable without public assistance and cooperation, without eyes that 
detect risks, ears that hear threats, and the willingness to report to 
authorities.297 
Unfortunately, the Honduran polity continues to accept “tough on crime” rhetoric and 
support the illiberal security policies of “mano dura” first implemented during the 
Maduro administration.  Current Honduran President Zelaya continues the failed policies 
of Maduro rather than attempting a different approach.  He increased military 
participation in traditional police actions implementing “Operation Thunder,” despite 
ongoing allegations of human rights abuses by security forces.  Leggett writes that 
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“saturation patrols,” like Operation Thunder, “might suppress street crime in a narrowly 
defined geographic area for a period of time, but they do nothing about the causes of that 
crime.”298   
The Honduran constitution’s concern for citizen participation in national defense 
may make the issue of firearm destruction as contentious as gun control laws in the 
United States.  It is reasonable to assume that the large number of guns in Honduras 
reflects a strong demand for ownership among the people.  However, the presence of 
firearms can turn a violent encounter into a deadly encounter and for this reason, it is 
argued that the relative scarcity of firearms in Nicaragua has resulted in lower homicide 
rates. 
Lastly, while civil-society organizations are allowed to operate in Honduras, they 
are not as effective or as numerous as Nicaragua because social movements did not 
mobilize as they did subsequent the end of the Sandinista Revolution.  Raudales 
characterizes the initiatives of civil-society organizations in Honduras as “scattered and 
sometimes illogical.”299 And Freedom House complains that “with the exception of some 
business groups, the [Honduran] government has generally exhibited little inclination to 
take the views of civil society into account when formulating policy.”300    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Joanna Mateo, who was at the time the Senior Policy Analyst for “The Western 
Hemisphere Security Analysis Center (WHEMSAC),” makes the case that 
USSOUTHCOM could potentially have a positive role in combating the maras in 
Honduras.  She bases her assessment on a four day trip to Honduras where she spoke 
with “a number of [unnamed] individuals involved in addressing the gangs issue…”301  
She reports that most of these individuals “were receptive to the idea of some level of 
DoD involvement in the issue,” and some even remarked that “Honduras would be the 
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best-suited of the countries in...[Central America] for U.S. military personnel to offer 
assistance to anti-gang initiatives…due to the positive image Hondurans have of their 
own military…[and] also because of history, where in countries such as El Salvador or 
Guatemala, memories of civil conflict and U.S. involvement in those conflicts have left a 
less-positive view of U.S. forces.”302 
Despite generally good relations between the two countries, in 1988, university 
students attacked and burned U.S. embassy offices after Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, 
was extradited to the United States on drug trafficking and murder charges.  No one 
disputed Matta’s guilt; students were protesting what they perceived to be U.S. disdain 
for Honduran laws that forbade the extradition of its citizens for crimes committed in 
another country.  James LeMoyne, writing for “The New York Times,” captures the irony 
of the moment: “That someone suspected of drug trafficking and murder could become a 
symbol of Honduran nationalism is one of the bizarre twists of Central America’s 
politics.”303 The continued presence of U.S. troops at Soto Cano Air Base at Comayagua, 
Honduras, periodically inspires a broad coalition of groups to protest the perceived 
affront to Honduran sovereignty.  Issues of nationalism can, at times, outweigh concerns 
for law and order.   
To suggest that the United States should involve its military in anti-gang 
initiatives in Honduras is reckless.  Past efforts to collaborate with Latin American 
militaries have been mired in controversy.  Furthermore, approaches to violent crime that 
focus exclusively on deterrence without social programs that target the underlying 
sources of violence and offer ways to integrate excluded segments into society are likely 
to result in human rights abuses, greater organization on behalf of gangs, and continued 
bloodshed.   
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The United States gave approximately $196 million to Honduras in foreign aid in 
FY 2005-2008.304  The Congressional Research Service reports that an additional $12.4 
million has been requested for Honduras under the Mérida Initiative for 2009.305  The 
DoS has leverage to push Honduras to demilitarize its police force and emulate the 
community-based rehabilitation responses to violent crime implemented by its southern 
neighbors.  Additionally, the United States must stop the illegal flow of firearms crossing 
into Mexico through Arizona and Texas (the United States dominates the international 
arms market and U.S.-origin weapons can be found throughout the world) and should 
advocate that Honduras make aggressive efforts to purge the country of firearms.  
Because any effort to legislate against firearm ownership may provoke a backlash and 
motivate unarmed citizens to buy a weapon before they become scarce, buy-back 
programs should be voluntary and compliment strict sentencing guidelines for illegal 
possession of a firearm.  New arms regulations should be coupled with the widest 
possible dissemination of the legal details through all available media outlets.   
The militarization of law enforcement will not reduce violent crime.  The United 
States should pressure the Honduran government to support (monetarily and politically) 
civil-society organizations that offer rehabilitative services to disadvantaged groups.  
Additionally, programs and laws should be designed and implemented to reduce the 
number of firearms in the country.  Finally, the police must be reformed with a greater 
regard for human rights.  These recommendations, implemented incrementally and with a 
system to measure progress, will reduce violent crime in Honduras and help stabilize the 
region.     
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